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INTRODUCTION
It all started with a pimp and a prostitute—or, at least, two individuals
posing as such.1 The duo walked into the field office of a fair housing
organization, openly seeking funding to operate a brothel.2
The
organization, one reliant on congressional funding, listened to the duo‘s
inquiry and seemingly assisted the couple in achieving their illicit activity;
the exchange was caught on videotape.3
The two were hardly hustler and harlot; rather, they were political
activists seeking to bring the organization down through a self-inspired
sting operation.4 With some creative editing and distribution to the media,
the duo‘s video spread like wildfire, implicating the organization as a
willing accomplice to criminal activity.5 In the wake of public furor,
Congress passed legislation wholly denying federal funding to the group.6
Financially incapacitated, the organization sought any means to recover its
lost funding. It brought suit against the United States through an oddly

1. See ACORN Workers Caught on Tape Allegedly Advising on Prostitution, CNN
POLITICS (Sept. 11, 2009, 10:21 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/10/acorn.prostitution/ (summarizing the events of
a sting operation against a fair housing public interest organization, the Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now, also known as ACORN). The events described
here, leading to the congressional ban on appropriations to ACORN, are discussed in greater
detail in Part III, infra.
2. See id. (detailing James O‘Keefe‘s solicitation of ACORN‘s Baltimore office ―for
advice on how to set up a prostitution ring involving more than a dozen underage girls from
El Salvador‖).
3. See id. (noting that both ACORN staffers ―appear[ed] enthusiastic to help‖ by
encouraging the supposed prostitute to ―refer to herself as a ‗performing artist‘ on tax
forms‖ and also noting that the sting was caught on tape).
4. See id. (describing the alleged prostitute and pimp as conservative activists and
exploring previous, unsuccessful attempts at filmed sting operations).
5. See id. (elaborating on the allegations of assisting the supposed pimp and prostitute
with ―setting up a prostitution ring and evading the IRS‖).
6. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, § 163, 123
Stat. 2023, 2053 (2009) (prohibiting any federal funding from being appropriated to
ACORN and its affiliates).

effective, yet unobvious constitutional provision: the Bill of Attainder
Clause.7
The Bill of Attainder Clause is arguably one of the most rarely-litigated
constitutional clauses in our legal history.8 Born out of a desire to prohibit
brash punishment of Loyalist sympathizers in the aftermath of the
Revolution, the Clause has since taken on several transformations in the
brief appearances it has made over the last two centuries.9 In the past few
decades, it has served as a restraint of last resort on the actions of Congress;
now, it is poised to constrain the seemingly unlimited ―power of the
purse‖—the congressional appropriations power.10
However, it remains uncertain as to whether the Bill of Attainder Clause,
often perceived as a relic of history, can constitutionally restrain the power
to appropriate, one of the most sacrosanct powers solely possessed by
Congress.11 In one of the few instances where the Bill of Attainder Clause
was successfully litigated, the Supreme Court seemed to say that such
constraint was lawful.12 But in light of the divergent interpretations of the
Clause and the growing number of judicial observations affirming
legislative supremacy in the field of appropriations, the answer may not be
so clear-cut.
This Comment argues that the Bill of Attainder Clause can almost never
serve to constrain Congress‘ targeted and specified withdrawal of
appropriations to an organization. Part I of the Comment discusses the
history of the Bill of Attainder Clause and the Appropriations Clause, and
7. See generally ACORN v. United States (ACORN I), 662 F. Supp. 2d 285, 299–300
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (enjoining the United States from enforcing the appropriations ban against
ACORN on the grounds that it violated the Bill of Attainder Clause), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010).
8. See, e.g., R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 105 (R.I. 1995)
(observing ―that the bill of attainder clause is rarely used to invalidate legislation‖); see
generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (preventing the federal government from passing bills
of attainder).
9. See discussion infra Part I.B (examining the history of the Bill of Attainder Clause
and its subsequent legal evolutions).
10. See ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (invalidating the legislated blocking of
federal funding for one identified organization via the Bill of Attainder Clause). The
prohibition against bills of attainder is also imposed on the states through the Contracts
Clause; any potential restraint that the Bill of Attainder Clause poses on Congress‘ ability to
appropriate also has implications for state legislatures. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
(―No state shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . .‖); see also Fraternal Order of Police
Hobart Lodge No. 121, Inc. v. City of Hobart, 864 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing
that ―no legislature, state or federal, may pass a bill of attainder‖ under the Constitution).
However, for purposes of simplified discussion, this Comment will assume state-based
legislative appropriations and congressional appropriations are alike; any variation in the
dichotomy between the federal and state systems is outside the scope of this Comment.
11. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7 (stating that ―no money shall be drawn from the
Treasury‖ without an appropriation made by law).
12. See generally United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946) (striking down part
of an appropriations bill on the grounds that it violated the Bill of Attainder Clause).

summarizes the status of both clauses in federal jurisprudence today. Part
II describes the political and legal background to the litigation that brought
forward an attainder challenge to the withdrawal of congressional
appropriations. Part III applies the Bill of Attainder Clause to the
congressional appropriations power, using both the current test and an
alternative one, and gauges the validity of conceptual rationales for the Bill
of Attainder Clause in light of congressional appropriations.
As
constitutional interpretation often yields differing viewpoints, alternative
analyses of the Bill of Attainder Clause are also addressed. In light of the
overextension and inefficacy of the current attainder analysis, this
Comment concludes by calling for a return to the strict, narrow
interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in an effort to avoid a
constitutional conflict with Congress‘ supreme appropriations power.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. A Tool of Convenience: The British Legacy of Bills of Attainder
Bills of attainder were legislative devices that originated from the lateMedieval era English Parliaments.13 In modern parlance, a bill of attainder
is legislation that targets individuals or easily ascertained members of a
group, and inflicts upon them a designated punishment without the
protections of a judicial trial.14 The date of passage of the first bill of
attainder is unclear,15 but throughout the Tudor and Stuart dynasties, bills
of attainder were popular in nullifying the political opposition.16 The reach
of Parliament‘s taint ran far and wide; clergy protesting royal extravagance,
traitorous soldiers, and the wives of Henry VIII all fell victim to legislative
declarations of guilt.17 The ―tainting‖ associated with attainder was from
the ―corruption of . . . blood‖ that would arise from a declaration of guilt
and treason.18 As a result, the estates of the attainted dead were escheated
13. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 847
(1984) (describing the practice of passing bills of attainder as an ancient one, originating
from the English Parliament); see also Raoul Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of
Amendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355, 374 & n.130 (1978) (debating whether
the exclusion of tainted male issue in a certain case during the late 1390s Parliament
constituted a bill of attainder).
14. Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722 (1951) (citing Lovett, 328 U.S. at
315).
15. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 68 (1999).
16. Jane Welsh, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee of
Process, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 83 & n.18 (1983).
17. LEVY, supra note 15, at 69.
18. Charles H. Wilson, Jr., Comment, The Supreme Court’s Bill of Attainder Doctrine:
A Need for Clarification, 54 CAL. L. REV. 212, 213–14 (1966). The corruption of blood
meant that the heirs of the attainted dead ―could not inherit and no one could inherit from
him.‖ Id. (citation omitted). In short, ―the attainted was wiped out as if he had never been
born.‖ Id. at 214 (citation omitted).

back to the respective Lord or to the Crown.19 Instead of dealing with the
lengthy formalities of a trial, both Parliament and the King had a
convenient method of dealing with the political enemies of the Crown and
country: a legislative declaration of guilt could simply be enacted to
dispense with the protections and procedures of law.20
Parliament also passed bills of ―pains and penalties.‖21 Such bills
differed from bills of attainder in that they did not confer the highest
penalty of death, but rather substituted banishment, seizure of property,
imprisonment, or some other form of ―lower‖ punishment for political
treason not quite worthy of death.22 Bills of pains and penalties also carried
a potentially lethal ―taint‖—for instance, a person who aided a guilty party
in escaping legislatively imposed imprisonment or evading the authorities
would be found guilty of a felony, and both the imprisoned party and the
aider would be put to death for defying Parliament‘s prescribed
punishment.23
Both bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties shared four
common characteristics: first, an accused identified by name; second,
Parliament‘s justifications for according punishment to that party; third, a
declaration of guilt, oftentimes contrary to common law and made for a
special purpose; and fourth, a prescription of punishment.24 The fourth
factor made the difference as to whether a bill was one of attainder or one
―merely‖ of pains and penalties.25
B. Prohibiting Legislative Punishment: The Beginning of an American
Constitutional Tradition
English colonial settlers brought bills of attainder and bills of pains and
penalties with them to the New World, but use of such bills was rare until
the American Revolution. The rebelling colonies and their early state
successors would use bills of attainder to escheat the property of those
loyal to the Crown back to the state government.26 But after the
Revolution, with the inflamed passions of the war dying down, the use of
19. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *252 (explaining that the ―feudal
covenant and mutual bond of fealty‖ are broken when one is guilty of legal attainder).
20. Wilson, supra note 18, at 214.
21. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *256.
22. Wilson, supra note 18, at 214.
23. Bills of Attainder, 1 W. JURIST 73, 79 (1867). In addition, fleeing from
imprisonment or failing to surrender after committing a felony would be ―taintable‖
offenses, referred to as a ―conditional attainder.‖ Berger, supra note 13, at 374–75.
24. Bills of Attainder, supra note 23, at 81; Wilson, supra note 18, at 214.
25. See Berger, supra note 13, at 357 (describing the ―inseparable indicia‖ of a bill of
attainder as crime, death, and corruption of blood and arguing that to have a ―milder degree
of punishment‖ would lower a bill of attainder to a bill of pains and penalties).
26. LEVY, supra note 15, at 71.

bills of attainder fell ―rapidly into disrepute,‖ eventually giving birth to the
federal Bill of Attainder Clause.27 It was evident the Founding Fathers
recognized that, had they lost the war, they would have been subject to the
wrath of a parliamentary declaration of treason.28
Between the Constitutional Convention and the Civil War, the Bill of
Attainder Clause rarely had the chance to be litigated. In one early
interpretation of the Clause, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged, in dicta,
that bills of attainder could come in many forms, with the power to ―affect
the life of an individual . . . confiscate his property . . . or . . . do both.‖29
The Chief Justice was absolute in his condemnation of such legislative
abuse, proclaiming ―[i]n this form, the power of the legislature over the
lives and fortunes of individuals is expressly restrained.‖30 The revulsion
that he expressed towards legislative interference with judicial functions
echoed prominently in the expansive interpretations of the Bill of Attainder
Clause to come.31
1. Crafting the expanse: the first modern, functionalist interpretation of
the Bill of Attainder Clause
Almost prophetic in its dormancy, it was not until the Civil War that the
Bill of Attainder Clause made its most significant impact. An uptick of
loyalty oaths, prompted by concerns over lingering Confederate sentiments
in a fractured Union, brought the first cases to shape the discourse of the
prohibition against attainder to the Supreme Court.32
The first modern attainder cases involved an odd pairing of groups: the
Roman Catholic Church and the remnants of the Confederate States of
America. In Cummings v. Missouri,33 a Roman Catholic priest was jailed

27. Welsh, supra note 16, at 89. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (proscribing
the passage of bills of attainder by Congress). From this point onward, any reference to
―bills of attainder,‖ unless otherwise noted, will refer to both bills of attainder and bills of
pains and penalties.
28. See Welsh, supra note 16, at 84 (suggesting the possibility that ―the Framers of the
American Constitution must have been extremely sensitive to the likelihood that they could
have been the targets of a Parliamentary bill of attainder had America lost its war for
independence‖); see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1344, at 217 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co. 5th ed.
1994) (1891) (explaining the English use of bills of attainder during times of rebellion).
29. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137–38 (1810).
30. Id. at 138.
31. E.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 446 (1965) (using the Fletcher rationale
to strike down legislation on the grounds that the Framers intended to limit Congress to the
―task of rule-making‖).
32. E.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 332 (1866) (striking down a
state-mandated, anti-Confederate loyalty oath required to become a priest); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 (1866) (prohibiting the use of an anti-Confederate
loyalty oath in swearing in lawyers).
33. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).

and fined for refusing to take an oath to state and country.34 Postbellum
Missouri determined that those who failed to take a loyalty oath could not
―be competent, as a bishop, priest, deacon, minister, elder, or other
clergyman, of any religious persuasion, sect, or denomination, to teach, or
preach, or solemnize marriages.‖35 Missouri couched its test oath as a
legitimate qualification of office:
a determination of ―fitness or
capacity . . . for a particular pursuit or profession‖ within the purview of the
state‘s police power.36 A similar, congressionally-imposed loyalty oath
arose in Ex parte Garland37 where an attorney was barred from the practice
of law for not first swearing under oath that he had not been an officer in
the Confederate government.38
Both cases were considered together, and both resulted in declarations of
legislative attainder by a divided Supreme Court.39 Justice Field, writing
for the majority in both cases, railed against the use of the legislative power
to unduly punish individuals for a legislative perception of past
disloyalty.40 In Cummings, the Court rejected the notion that bills of
attainder, as a matter of law, had to constitute a deprivation of ―life, liberty,
or property, and that to take from [an individual] anything less than these is
no punishment at all.‖41 Justice Field wrote, ―[t]he Constitution deals with
substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was levelled at the thing, not the
name.‖42 To the majority, punishment based on the perception of guilt, not
the determination of guilt by the judiciary, was ―repugnant to the true
genius of the common law.‖43
Justice Miller, joined by Chief Justice Chase and two other justices,
disagreed.44 The dissenters emphasized a need to respect the congressional
mandate; they perceived that the right to practice law, much like any other
profession, was a right granted by congressional grace, subject to the
34. Id. at 316.
35. Id. at 317.
36. Id. at 319.
37. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
38. Id. at 376–77.
39. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 332 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that
Ex parte Garland ―involved principles of a character similar to those discussed in
[Cummings,]‖ thus relying on the Ex parte Garland dissent to protest the majority‘s opinion
in Cummings).
40. See id. at 322 (majority opinion) (―It was against the excited action of the States . . .
that the framers of the Federal Constitution intended to guard.‖).
41. Id. at 320.
42. Id. at 325.
43. Id. at 331. This language was borrowed from Alexander Hamilton‘s ―A Second
Letter from Phocion.‖ See id. at 330 (noting that the repugnant nature of an oath under the
Bill of Attainder Clause was written about by Alexander Hamilton).
44. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 382 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting). Ex
parte Garland served as the consolidated dissent for both cases. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) at 332 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (relying on the dissent in Ex parte Garland to serve
as the Cummings dissent).

whims of the legislative will.45 Justice Miller‘s dissent advocated for a
traditionalist view of bills of attainder; with very little American
jurisprudence to go by, he turned to England‘s laws of attainder and found
little comparison between the loyalty oaths and laws capable of tainting an
individual.46 The unconstitutional nature of a legislative act, according to
Justice Miller, ―should be so clear as to leave little reason for doubt.‖47 The
dissent‘s proposed test for attainder required three primary factors, none of
which were present in the respective oath requirements: first, a legislative
usurpation of the judicial role in determining convictions and sentences;
second, the lack of any previous law to inflict the sentence and punishment;
and third, an investigation into the guilt of the accused without the presence
of the accused or his counsel.48 Lacking these central elements, a vocal
minority on the Court maintained that the loyalty oath requirements were
indeed not bills of attainder.49
About eighty years passed before the Supreme Court next had a major
opportunity to revisit the Bill of Attainder Clause.50 The case arose in
another post-war period filled with suspicion of potential traitors to the
United States: the Cold War. In United States v. Lovett,51 three federal
employees had their salaries stripped by Congress through the Urgent
Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943,52 on belief that ―‗subversives‘ were
occupying influential positions in the Government and elsewhere and that
their influence must not remain unchallenged.‖53 The Act mandated, in
pertinent part, that ―[n]o part of any appropriation contained in this Act
shall be used to pay the salary or wages of any person who advocates, or
who is a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the
Government of the United States by force or violence . . . .‖54 Section 304
of the Act proceeded to identify Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Jr.,
and Robert Morss Lovett as three individuals who were explicitly
forbidden from benefitting from the appropriations act.55 Short of
receiving juror pay or pay from service in the armed forces, the three were

45. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 384–85.
46. See id. at 385–90 (observing that, in light of the British tradition of bills of
attainder, a statute without a criminal designation of punishment and lacking an infliction of
punishment could ―in no sense be called a bill of attainder‖).
47. Id. at 382.
48. Id. at 388.
49. Id. at 389–90.
50. See Welsh, supra note 16, at 93 (describing the evolution of the Bill of Attainder
Clause post-Cummings and the corresponding passage of time).
51. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
52. Pub. L. No. 78-132, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943).
53. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308.
54. § 301, 57 Stat. at 449.
55. Id. § 304, at 450.

forbidden from receiving salary, refund, or reimbursement from the public
treasury.56
Section 304 was the product of fierce advocacy from the Chairman and
one of the founding members of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities, Representative Martin Dies, Jr.57 On February 1, 1943,
Congressman Dies launched into a diatribe on the House floor, naming
thirty-nine federal government employees as ―‗irresponsible,
unrepresentative, crackpot, radical bureaucrats‘ and affiliates of
‗communist front organizations.‘‖58 He urged Congress to strip funding for
these individuals‘ salaries.59 Congress was divided as to how to respond;
some Members wanted to accept Representative Dies‘ accusations as fact;
others wanted to avoid the appearance of a ―star chamber‖ approach to
declaring guilt.60 A committee inquiry subsequently took place; the
congressional committee compelled testimony from several witnesses (and
the deliberate exclusion of others), and found Lovett, Watson, and Dodd to
be ―guilty of having engaged in ‗subversive activity within the definition
adopted by the Committee.‘‖61
Deeming section 304 unconstitutional, the Court strongly admonished
the legislation as ―the punishment of named individuals without a judicial
trial.‖62 The fact that Congress investigated the three individuals, deemed
them guilty of ―engaging in ‗subversive activities,‘ defined that term for the
first time, and sentenced them to perpetual exclusion from any government
employment‖ made section 304 a classic legislative infliction of
punishment that was prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause.63 The
Court then proceeded to declare section 304 unconstitutional, and
effectively permitted Lovett, Watson, and Dodd to receive their rightful
pay.64 More importantly, the Court reaffirmed the earlier notions that the
definition of punishment was expansive, and punishment could be
legislated in many different forms.

56. Id.
57. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308 (examining the legislative history leading up to the
passage of section 163). See generally Dies, Martin, Jr., (1900 – 1972), BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000338 (last visited Jan. 16,
2011) (explaining Martin Dies‘ committee involvement in the House of Representatives,
including with the Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities).
58. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308–09.
59. Id. at 309.
60. See id. at 309–10 (exploring the legislative history behind section 304 and general
congressional sentiment to the Dies accusations).
61. Id. at 311.
62. Id. at 316.
63. Id. at 316.
64. Id. at 318.

2.

True, faithful, and narrow: Justice Frankfurter and the literalist
approach
While the Court‘s attainder analysis in Lovett was fairly brief and
straightforward, it was Justice Felix Frankfurter‘s concurring opinion that
sparked a divergence in the Court‘s discourse on the subject. Justice
Frankfurter agreed that the three individuals were owed their salary for
their contributions to the federal government, but viewed the legislative ban
and termination of funds as a breach of contract, not a constitutional
violation.65 Thus, section 304 merely served to impede the fulfillment of a
contractual obligation between employer and employee, and was not
legislative punishment as posited by the majority of the Court.66
Justice Frankfurter was absolutely loathe to broach the constitutional
issue.67 He viewed the Bill of Attainder Clause as a specific provision
designed to prohibit a ―very special, narrowly restricted, intervention by the
legislature, in matters for which a decent regard for men‘s interests
indicated a judicial trial.‖68 The Bill of Attainder Clause, Justice
Frankfurter argued, was a historical relic—a constitutionalized break from
the English tradition of prescribing the judicial functions to the
legislature.69 An elemental approach to an attainder analysis was
necessary; without the specification of an offense and person,70 declaration
of guilt,71 or punishment for a past offense,72 a legislative act could not be
deemed a bill of attainder. Short of the narrow circumstances where these
conditions were met, Justice Frankfurter believed that other constitutional
65. See id. at 330 (―I feel compelled to construe § 304 as did Mr. Chief Justice Whaley
below whereby it merely prevented the ordinary disbursal of money to pay respondents‘
salaries.‖) (internal citations omitted).
66. See id. (―[Section 304] did not cut off the obligation of the Government to pay for
services rendered . . . .‖).
67. See id. at 319 (explaining Frankfurter‘s desire to ―prevent a collision between
Congress and Court‖).
68. Id. at 322. Frankfurter was not the first to espouse this view of the Bill of Attainder
Clause; since the post-Civil War era, there had been some belief that the Bill of Attainder
Clause had ―an established and technical signification long before the framing and adoption
of the Constitution of the United States, and was well understood by the men who framed
that instrument,‖ thus requiring all interpretations to be bound by the historical approach.
Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 430–31 (1868) (Mason, J., dissenting).
69. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 322 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (calling for a literal,
originalist view of the Bill of Attainder Clause). In emphasizing the literalist approach,
Frankfurter refers to Timothy Farrar‘s Manual of the Constitution of the United States of
America, which notes that the concept of the bill of attainder, as discussed above, was
imported from England; see id. (internal citations omitted). Presumably, Frankfurter was
thinking of Britain‘s long-standing model of powers, in which the supreme judicial
functions were carried out by the House of Lords. See id.
70. See id. at 322–23.
71. See id. at 323.
72. See id. at 324 (connecting the prohibition against bills of attainder to the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the Constitution, in that there must be punishment for a past offense and a
true bill of attainder would double up as both a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law).

provisions, such as the Due Process Clause, more appropriately served to
protect the rights of those who could not meet his rigid standards as to
punishment with respect to the Bill of Attainder Clause.73
Justice Frankfurter‘s literal, originalist approach to the Bill of Attainder
Clause gained prominence throughout the Cold War era. In American
Communications Ass’n v. Douds,74 the Court held that a statute requiring
labor unions to sign affidavits affirming that its officers were not members
of the Communist Party did not constitute a bill of attainder.75 Chief
Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, emphasized that a bill must punish a
person for past actions; congressional action to prevent future conduct,
however likely and predictable that such conduct would take place, did not
make a bill of attainder.76
It was not until 1961 that Justice Frankfurter had an opportunity to fully
elaborate his narrow view of the Bill of Attainder Clause. In Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,77 Justice Frankfurter
synthesized his controversial interpretation of the Bill of Attainder
Clause.78 Speaking for a divided Court,79 he relied on the elemental
approach he first set out in his Lovett concurrence.80 The statute in
question, which required all ―Communist-action organization[s]‖ to register
with the Attorney General (with criminal penalties for failing to do so),81
was missing the key element of specificity; that is, no person or
organization had specifically been named by Congress for registration.82
Moreover, Justice Frankfurter expressed his strong distaste for judicial

73. See id. at 321–22 (dividing constitutional claims into two types—one involving the
broad standards of fairness, such as the due process clause, and the other being a ―very
specific‖ type of constitutional provision, such as the prohibition of bills of attainder).
74. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
75. See id. at 413–14 (establishing that past conduct can serve as ―substantial ground‖
for congressional judgment with respect to ―what the future conduct is likely to be‖).
76. See id. at 414 (deeming that Congress‘ purpose with the legislation was to ―forestall
future dangerous acts,‖ thus foreclosing the notion that the statute was a bill of attainder).
77. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
78. The controversy over which definition of attainder to accept arose in one of the next
cases to appear before the Court, United States v. Brown. The Brown Court explicitly
rejected the ―narrow[] [and] technical‖ definition of attainder that Justice Frankfurter had
espoused. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
79. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart voted in the majority;
Chief Justice Warren, as well as Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan were in the minority.
Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 1.
80. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
81. See Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 8, 11 (describing the provisions of the
Subversive Activities Control Act and listing the criminal sanctions for failing to comply).
82. See id. at 86 (asserting that the specificity requirement requires a designation of
particular persons). But see id. at 145–47 (Black, J., dissenting) (condemning the singling
out of one party and deeming such legislation as a Bill of Attainder and a due process
violation).

intervention; to him, legislative acts commanded the highest deference83
and demanded the clearest proof of unconstitutionality.84 Despite a clear
legislative history and intent revealing that the bill was intentionally
targeted to eliminate the Communist Party,85 the Court respected Congress‘
abidance by its constitutional power and safeguards, and ingrained a
limited interpretation of the Clause in the nation‘s jurisprudence.86
3.

The swinging pendulum: the uncertain present-day status quo
It may be tempting to conclude that Douds and Communist Party clearly
broke from Lovett and relegated the Bill of Attainder Clause to nothing
more than a historical relic. But the Court‘s position was far from clear;
while there were two obvious perspectives on the matter, neither had a
lasting majority on the Court, making the future of the Clause quite
uncertain.87
This was evidenced by the reappearance of the more expansive,
functionalist approach to the Clause in United States v. Brown.88 In 1959,
Congress passed a statute that made it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve in the leadership of a labor union.89 In striking
down the statute as a bill of attainder, the Court fired back at the waning
Frankfurter rationale.90 It declared, ―[t]he best available evidence, the
writings of the architects of our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill
of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore
soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the
83. See id. at 86 (majority opinion) (yielding to the legislature ―[s]o long as Congress
acts in pursuance of its constitutional power‖ (citations omitted)).
84. Id. at 83 (―Of course, ‗only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute on [Bill of Attainder grounds].‘‖ (quoting Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960))).
85. See id. at 84 (establishing that the legislation was passed with the objective of
―expos[ing] the Communist movement and protect[ing] the public against innocent and
unwitting collaboration with it‖ (quoting S. Rep. No. 81-2369, at 4 (1950)).
86. See id. at 86–88 (listing the requirements for a statute to be deemed a bill of
attainder and finding that the law in question did not ―offend[] the constitutional prohibition
of attainder‖).
87. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 18, at 212–13 (describing the ―abrupt and emphatic
departure‖ that United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), caused from the ―narrow and
technical attainder doctrine developed in the 1950‘s‖).
88. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
89. Id. at 439 n.1 (citing Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 504, 73 Stat. 519, 537 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 504
(2006)).
90. By this time, Justice Frankfurter had passed away; Justice Arthur Goldberg, who
succeeded Frankfurter on the Court, voted with the majority. See, e.g., id. at 437. Justices
White, Clark, Harlan, and Stewart maintained Frankfurter‘s mantle of judicial restraint,
dissenting from the majority opinion and condemning the Court‘s ―discard[ing] [of the]
meticulous multifold analysis that has been deemed necessary in the past.‖ Id. at 463
(White, J., dissenting). So long as a rational basis for Congress‘ desire to prevent future
conduct existed, the dissenters argued, and the means were reasonable, the legislation could
not constitute a bill of attainder. See id. at 478.

separation of powers.‖91 Congress‘ failure to use ―rules of general
applicability,‖ and its imposition of a criminal prohibition specifically
targeting the Communist Party, satisfactorily constituted a bill of attainder
for the Court.92
Despite the need to resolve the extant vacillation between the broad
functionalist approach and the narrow originalist interpretation, the two
major cases decided since Brown have not shed much additional light. In
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,93 the Court dealt with the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,94 which
specifically mandated that President Nixon surrender his personal
presidential papers to the Administrator of General Services (and
consequently, the National Archives).95 The Court, while recognizing that
the anti-Frankfurterian approach in Brown and Lovett ―unquestionably gave
broad and generous meaning to the constitutional protection against bills of
attainder,‖ nevertheless relied on the more elemental approach to the
attainder doctrine, citing the lack of punitive intent and punishment on the
part of Congress as reason not to declare the act a bill of attainder.96
The Nixon Court was instrumental in solidifying the importance of
punishment in determining whether a particular law constituted a bill of
attainder.
The Bill of Attainder Clause, the Court noted, was
―anchor[ed] . . . to realistic conceptions of classification and punishment.‖97
Nevertheless, as specificity and classification alone ―[did] not
automatically offend the Bill of Attainder Clause,‖ the ―starting point‖ of
any attainder inquiry was whether ―a form of punishment [had been]
leveled against [an individual].‖98 The Court proceeded to dissect the
concept of ―punishment‖ under the Bill of Attainder Clause into three
interrelated tests. One category of punishment existed if it ―[fell] within
the historical meaning of legislative punishment.‖99
Alternatively,
punishment could also exist if a law imposed severe burdens without
legitimate legislative purposes.100 Finally, punishment could also be
91. Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 (majority opinion).
92. See id. at 461–62 (proscribing Congress from passing legislation specifying the
people upon whom a sanction would be levied).
93. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
94. Pub. L. No. 93-526, § 101, 88 Stat. 1695, 1695 (1974).
95. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 433–34 (citing § 101, 88 Stat. at 1695) (describing the
provisions within the Act that transferred lawful possession of the Nixon recordings and
files to the Administrator of General Services).
96. See id. at 469, 474–75 (elaborating on the history of bills of attainder and noting
that President Nixon could not ―claim to have suffered any of these forbidden deprivations
at the hands of Congress‖ simply by being forced to relinquish his personal papers).
97. Id. at 470.
98. Id. at 471–73.
99. Id. at 475.
100. See id. at 475–76.

present if a burden was imposed with a ―legislative record [that] evince[d]
a congressional intent to punish.‖101 Failing to discern any of these criteria,
the Court rejected President Nixon‘s claim that the Act constituted a bill of
attainder.102
Disapproving of the majority‘s rationale, the Nixon dissenters further
muddied the opaque understanding of the Bill of Attainder Clause. To
Chief Justice Burger, only two elements were necessary: first, a specific
designation of a person or a group; and second, an arbitrary deprivation
akin to the deprivation of employment (or property rights in general) as
seen in Cummings and Garland.103 Presidential papers, Chief Justice
Burger argued, constituted property, and the deprivation of such property
went to the heart of the prohibited punishment enshrined in the Bill of
Attainder Clause.104
Nixon, however, failed to resolve the lingering question as to whether a
strict, Frankfurterian interpretation of the Clause was appropriate, or
whether an expansive, functionalist approach was warranted; instead, the
Court combined both the historical test and the functional test into one
amalgamated analysis.105 Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public
Research Group,106 also did little to clear the air. The case involved the
Military Selective Service Act,107 which required male citizens between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-six to register with the Selective Service, the
agency responsible for enacting a military draft should it be deemed
necessary.108 Failure to do so led to the imposition of criminal penalties, as
well as preventing males that fell within this age range from qualifying for
federal financial aid.109 The Court declined to accept the attainder
challenge, primarily on the grounds that the Act lacked specificity as to a
single identifiable group: it applied to all qualifying male non-registrants,
101. See id. at 478.
102. See id. at 484.
103. See id. at 538–39 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 539–40 (explaining that ―our constitutional tradition‖ has been to treat
Presidential papers as the personal property of the President, thus subject to the Bill of
Attainder Clause as a deprivation of property, and subsequently examining the history of
Presidential papers).
105. See id. at 473–84 (majority opinion) (establishing the factors for analyzing a bill of
attainder claim).
106. 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
107. The enforcement provisions of the Military Selective Service Act were the
provisions actually at issue. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp.,
468 U.S. 841, 844 (1984) (describing Congress‘ enactment of the Department of Defense
Authorization Act of 1983); see also Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1113, 96 Stat. 718, 748 (1982) (creating enforcement provisions for
the Military Selective Service Act by tying federal aid to draft registration for eligible
males).
108. Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 843–45.
109. Id. at 843–44. As it is commonly known, males outside this age range and women,
as well as select others, were exempted from the requirement. Id. at 844 n.2.

an application too broad for what the Bill of Attainder Clause demanded.110
In addition, no matter how severe the denial of federal student financial aid
may have been,111 it did not constitute punishment in the historical sense,
and accomplished legitimate nonpunitive legislative goals of pursuing
compliance with the draft.112 Moreover, the legislative history strongly
supported the notion that nonpunitive goals were furthered, foreclosing the
legitimacy of the attainder-based arguments.113 Thus, the enforcement
provisions of the Act were deemed not to be a bill of attainder.114
However, while the Selective Service Court may have rejected the specific
attainder-based arguments presented, it rearticulated and reinforced a
somewhat well-defined test in deciphering what exactly constitutes a bill of
attainder,115 which resulted in the present state of the issue today.
C. Birth of the Public Fisc: Origins of the Appropriations Power
The legislative power to appropriate was seen even before the medieval
parliamentary acts of attainder, originating in the Magna Carta, which
decreed that ―[n]o scutage nor aid shall be imposed on [the English]
kingdom, unless by common counsel of [the] kingdom.‖116 This effectively
transformed into Parliament‘s limitations on the power of the King to raise
revenue and injected Parliament into the fiscal decision-making process.117
Gradually, with the evolution of the English common law, Parliament was
recognized to have ―possessed an indisputable sovereignty‖ in the matters
of lawmaking, taxation, and appropriation.118 Some English jurists went as

110. See id. at 847 n.3 (dismissing the notion that the denial of Title IV aid constituted
punishment).
111. See id. at 851 (recognizing ―that the severity of a sanction is not determinative of its
character as punishment‖).
112. Id. at 854 (citing 128 Cong. Rec. 9666 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Jepsen)) (noting
Congress‘ awareness that ―more than half a million young men had failed to comply with
the registration requirement‖ and proclaiming a response to such awareness was a legitimate
legislative purpose).
113. Id. at 855–56 (examining the legislative history of the registration enforcement
provisions and assessing it as ―convincing support for the view that . . . Congress sought, not
to punish anyone, but to promote compliance‖).
114. Id. at 856.
115. See infra Part IV.A (describing the three-part test established post-Selective Service
to determine whether legislation implicates punishment prohibited by the Bill of Attainder
Clause).
116. Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign
Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1217 (2009) (quoting WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE,
MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 232 (2d ed. 1914))
(internal quotations omitted).
117. Id. at 1217.
118. Id. at 1225 (quoting DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1845, at 10–12 (9th ed. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

far as to believe that the right to appropriate was an absolute one, solely
vested in ―the faith of Parliament.‖119
The notion of the legislature‘s supreme rule over the appropriations
process migrated across the Atlantic to the English New World. Colonial
governments conducted their limited public financing schemes under the
purview (and often abuse) of the colonial legislatures.120 After the
American Revolution and by the time of the Constitutional Convention, it
became clear that ―the right of appropriation could [not] be [properly]
exercised by any branch other than the legislature.‖121 This was by no
means an accident; many of the Framers, including Madison, recognized
that ―the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the
people.‖122 In the final iteration of the Constitution, legislative supremacy
over the so-called ―power of the purse‖ was enshrined in the
Appropriations Clause.123
Over the last two centuries, federal jurisprudence on the Appropriations
Clause validated this idea. In the nineteenth century, the Court of Claims
in Hart’s Case124 explicitly held that ―[t]he absolute control of the moneys
of the United States is in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its
exercise of this great power only to the people.‖125 The Supreme Court
voiced its opinion later that century, noting that claims and debts for
Congress to satisfy through appropriations ―depend[ed] solely upon
congress, and whether it will recognize claims thus founded must be left to
the discretion of that body.‖126
Despite the Court‘s holding in Lovett, there is an implied recognition of
Congress‘ supremacy and discretion to appropriate within the framework of
the Bill of Attainder Clause. In Flemming v. Nestor,127 the Social Security
Administration terminated the benefits of the respondent, Ephram Nestor,

119. Id. at 1237 (quoting Macbeath v. Haldimand, (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1036, (K.B.)
1038; 1 T.R. 172, 176).
120. See DONALD R. STABILE, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE: DEBATES
OVER MONEY, DEBT, AND TAXES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA, 1776–1836, at 20–21 (1998)
(describing the various colonial taxation protocols and the abuse of bills of credit by
colonial legislatures). A look to taxation is critical because without taxation, there can be no
appropriation. It is important to note that Britain retained the power to generally tax its
colonies in the New World, and often did, to fund its massive spending and public debt. See
id. at 21.
121. See Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 1252 (articulating the viewpoint of the
Framers).
122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 310 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
123. See Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 1239. See generally U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 7 (requiring that all disbursals from the treasury be prompted by an appropriation
of law).
124. 16 Ct. Cl. 459 (1880), aff’d, 118 U.S. 62 (1886).
125. Id. at 484.
126. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440–41 (1896) (emphasis added).
127. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).

on the grounds of his deportation, which in turn was based on his alleged
membership in the Communist Party during the 1930s.128 The Court
rejected the district court‘s finding that the deprivation of social security
benefits, which the Court described as ―a form of social insurance, enacted
pursuant to Congress‘ power to spend money in aid of the general welfare,‖
constituted the deprivation of property akin to the punishment forbidden by
the Bill of Attainder Clause.129
The Court went further in dismissing the respondent‘s attainder-based
arguments, noting that ―the clearest proof‖ was required to make such an
assertion of unconstitutionality; such was not present in Nestor‘s case.130
Moreover, the sanction was ―the mere denial of a noncontractual
governmental benefit,‖ hardly without a rational basis and far from
reaching the scope of penalties traditionally considered punishment, such
as imprisonment.131 Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, stressed the
importance of the long-standing deference to Congress in matters of
appropriations, positing that ―[w]hether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the
scheme of benefits . . . is not for us to say. The answer to such inquiries
must come from Congress, not the courts.‖132 To do otherwise would
require judicial assessment of Congressional motives, which the Flemming
Court deemed ―a hazardous matter.‖133 The Flemming decision exhibited
the Court‘s hesitance to intrude into an endeavor that was constitutionally
prescribed to Congress alone.
The clearest affirmation of Congress‘ supremacy in the field of
appropriations did not appear until the 1990s. In Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond,134 the Court made it quite clear that ―[m]oney
may be paid out only through an appropriation made by law; in other
words, the payment of money from the Treasury must be authorized by a
statute.‖135 The majority placed heavy emphasis on deferring to Congress
in the context of fiscal appropriations.136
The ―fundamental and
comprehensive purpose‖ of such deference was to ―assure that public funds
will be spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by
Congress as to the common good and not according to the individual favor

128. Id. at 604–05.
129. Id. at 608–09 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937)).
130. Id. at 617.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 611 (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644).
133. Id. at 617.
134. 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
135. Id. at 424.
136. See, e.g., id. at 427 (examining and accepting Justice Story‘s rationale that
Congressional control of spending is necessary to prevent fraud and corruption).

of Government agents or the individual pleas of litigants.‖137 In sum, the
Court determined it would be antithetical to the Constitution to allow
anyone other than Congress to determine who should benefit from the
public fisc. After Richmond, subsequent decisions by the circuit courts of
appeal followed suit in ardently affirming Congressional supremacy over
the appropriations power.138
II. SETTING THE STAGE: THE ACORN CRISIS
On July 24, 2009, two aspiring conservative activists, James O‘Keefe
and Hannah Giles, walked into the Baltimore office of the Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now, a public interest group
commonly referred to as ACORN.139 Armed with a hidden video camera,
O‘Keefe and Giles were set on entrapping the ACORN office in an
undercover sting operation, designed to elicit cooperation with apparent
criminal activity.140 O‘Keefe presented himself to the ACORN staff as an
aspiring lawyer and politician, and described Giles as being in a ―unique
business‖—prostitution.141 In a conversation filled with subtle undertones,
O‘Keefe and Giles communicated to the Baltimore ACORN staff that they
sought to purchase a home so that Giles could run her own prostitution
ring.142 The duo furthered the appearance of criminality by proposing that
child prostitutes from El Salvador would be utilized in this prostitution
ring.143 From the undercover footage, the Baltimore ACORN staff seemed
not only to condone the pair‘s feigned planning of criminal activities, but
seemed willing to be complicit in them.144

137. Id. at 427–28.
138. See, e.g., Am. Fed‘n. Gov‘t Emps. Local 1647 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 388
F.3d 405, 408–09 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming the purpose of the Appropriations Clause as the
―place[ment] [of] authority to dispose of public funds firmly in the hands of Congress‖);
City of Houston v. Dep‘t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (―It
is a well-settled matter . . . that . . . federal courts cannot order the expenditure of funds that
were covered by [a fully obligated or lapsed] appropriation.‖).
139. James O‘Keefe, Chaos for Glory: My Time with ACORN, BIG GOVERNMENT (Sept.
10, 2009, 6:10AM), http://biggovernment.com/jokeefe/2009/09/10/chaos-for-glory/#more274.
140. Id.
141. James O‘Keefe, Complete ACORN Baltimore Child Prostitution Investigation
Transcript, BIG GOVERNMENT, 1, 2–3 (Sept. 10, 2009, 6:49 AM),
http://biggovernment.com/jokeefe/2009/09/10/complete-acorn-baltimore-prostitutioninvestigation-transcript/.
142. See O‘Keefe, supra note 141, at 5–6 (showing a conversation between James
O‘Keefe, Hannah Giles, who is referred to as Kenya, and the ACORN staff, where ―Kenya‖
informs ACORN that she has a job that has ―male clients‖ that ―could get [her] in trouble‖).
143. See id. at 27 (recollecting the moment where the duo informs the ACORN staff that
―there are like 13 girls from El Salvador‖ who ―[would] be doing jobs‖).
144. See id. at 16 (documenting the ACORN staff informing the duo on how to artfully
comply with loan approval processes and tax filings).

The video was released on a conservative pundit‘s website and was
followed up with similar office visits to Washington D.C., Brooklyn, New
York, San Bernardino, and San Diego.145 Once the videos were released,
ACORN was subjected to public outrage and furor over its employees‘
willingness to facilitate the trafficking of underage girls for the sex trade.146
President Obama, who held ―infrequent ties‖ to the organization, jumped
into the fray by noting that the conduct of ACORN employees as displayed
on O‘Keefe‘s videos ―deserv[ed] to be investigated.‖147
Congress decided to take it a step further. A myriad of bills were
introduced by Republican leaders to completely strip ACORN of its
funding.148 However, instead of an independent bill, a funding ban against
ACORN was incorporated into a continuing legislative appropriations
resolution.149 Congress voted 345 to 75 to defund the organization.150

145. Videos of the trips were posted to the conservative website and blog,
―BigGovernment.com.‖ See generally James O‘Keefe, Washington, DC ACORN Video:
Child Prostitution Investigation, BIG GOVERNMENT (Sept. 11, 2009, 7:08 AM),
http://biggovernment.com/jokeefe/2009/09/11/washington-dc-acorn-video-childprostitution-investigation/; James O‘Keefe, ACORN Video: Prostitution Scandal in New
York, NY, BIG GOVERNMENT (Sept. 14, 2009, 12:35 AM),
http://biggovernment.com/jokeefe/2009/09/14/acorn-video-prostitution-scandal-in-newyork-ny/; James O‘Keefe, ACORN Prostitution Scandal: California Here We Come!, BIG
GOVERNMENT (Sept. 15, 2009, 1:49 PM),
http://biggovernment.com/jokeefe/2009/09/15/acorn-prostitution-scandal-california-herewe-come/ (documenting the San Bernardino sting); James O‘Keefe, ACORN Video:
Prostitution Scandal in San Diego, CA, BIG GOVERNMENT (Sept. 17, 2009, 3:53 AM),
http://biggovernment.com/jokeefe/2009/09/17/acorn-videoprostitution-scandal-in-san-diego-ca/. Since the videos were released, investigations have
been launched into the veracity and authenticity of the tapes, giving rise to suggestions that
the tapes were deliberately edited to fabricate ACORN‘s complicity in crime. See, e.g.,
CAL. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT‘Y GEN., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
THE ACTIVITIES OF ACORN IN CALIFORNIA 2–3 (Apr. 1, 2010), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1888_acorn_report.pdf (summarizing an
investigation conducted by the California Attorney General on the allegedly illicit activities
of ACORN as seen on the O‘Keefe videotapes while describing the videos as heavily
edited).
146. See Chris McGreal, Congress Cuts Funding to Embattled Anti-Poverty Group
ACORN, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Sept. 21, 2009, 16.38 BST),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/21/acorn-prostitution-videos (describing the
shock embraced by ―many Americans‖ over the ACORN workers‘ willingness to discuss
―the trafficking of girls for sex work‖).
147. Dan Eggen, President: ACORN Videos ‘Inappropriate’, WASH. POST (Sept. 21,
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002313.html.
148. See, e.g., Defund ACORN Act, H.R. 3571, 111th Cong. (2009); Protect Taxpayers
from ACORN Act, S. 1687, 111th Cong. (2009).
149. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, § 163, 123
Stat. 2023, 2053 (2009) (outlining ―appropriation[s] for the Legislative Branch for the fiscal
year ending September 30, 2010,‖ including the prohibition of funds from being ―made
available . . . to the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN),
or any of its affiliates, subsidiaries, or allied organizations‖).
150. Darryl Fears & Carol D. Leonnig, The $1,300 Mission to Fell ACORN, WASH.
POST. (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

A. Breaking New Ground: The District Court’s Decision
Not willing to let the legislation go unchallenged, ACORN filed suit to
enjoin the federal government from complying with the legislation.151
ACORN relied on the Bill of Attainder Clause to challenge section 163 of
the Continuing Resolution, which was interpreted by the Office of
Management and Budget to mean that ―[n]o agency or department should
obligate or award any Federal funds to ACORN or any of its affiliates.‖152
Such a singling out, ACORN argued, made the legislation a bill of
attainder, with the prohibition serving as punishment for the political
scandal surrounding the group.153
The trial court agreed with this assessment. In enjoining the federal
government from carrying out section 163, the trial court made five
principal observations. First, Lovett was ―particularly instructive‖ as a
starting point because it dealt with an appropriations bill that had a punitive
effect prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause.154 Second, there was no
valid, non-punitive purpose for Congress to enact legislation depriving
ACORN of funding.155 Third, less burdensome alternatives were available
to ensure that any legitimate objectives, even if they existed, could be
accomplished without a total appropriations ban.156 Fourth, based on the
legislative history, Congress determined ACORN‘s guilt before defunding
it.157 Finally, even if Congress intended to deter future criminal conduct by
using the public fisc, its act still constituted punishment; the goal of
deterring future acts, the court reasoned, was still a traditional rationale for
judicial punishment.158 With this assessment in tow, the district court

dyn/content/article/2009/09/17/AR2009091704805.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST200909170
4852.
151. See generally ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d 285, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining that
ACORN filed a suit against the United States challenging the Continuing Appropriations
Resolution as an unconstitutional bill of attainder) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 618 F.3d
125 (2d Cir. 2010).
152. Id. at 289 (quoting an ―OMB Memorandum‖ issued by Director Peter Orzag
(citations omitted)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 292.
155. See id. at 293 (explaining that the Government‘s reference to Flemming and
Selective Service to show the nonpunitive nature of its actions against ACORN was
inapposite because Flemming lacked a legislative record of purely punitive intent, and
Selective Service ―had the valid goal of encouraging a class of persons to . . . register for the
draft‖).
156. See id. at 295 (citing Congress‘ failure to rely on ―available mechanisms for
investigation‖ through various federal agencies).
157. See id. at 294 (―[T]he nature of the bar and the context within which it occurred
make it unmistakable that Congress determined ACORN‘s guilt before defunding it.‖)
158. See id. (rejecting the government‘s argument that the deterrence of future
misconduct was not a punitive aim under the Bill of Attainder Clause, and emphasizing that
the deterrence of future conduct ―is a traditional justification of punishment‖).

enjoined the United States from enforcing the congressionally-mandated
funding ban.159
B. An Appealing Appeal: The Second Circuit’s Restoration of the
ACORN Funding Ban
In the aftermath of the district court‘s ruling, the United States filed an
appeal with the Second Circuit,160 and the lower court‘s decision was
stayed.161 In an opinion released less than a year after the trial court‘s
injunction was issued, the Second Circuit, with Judge Miner writing for a
unanimous panel, vacated the trial court‘s invocation of the Bill of
Attainder Clause.162
In examining whether the withdrawal of
appropriations was within the scope of coverage of the Clause, the court,
using the post-Nixon/Selective Service test for punishment, evaluated the
historical punishment, functional punishment, and legislative
history/motivational prongs of the current attainder test.163
The court easily observed that the withdrawal of appropriations could
not constitute punishment as defined historically, failing the first part of the
three-pronged punishment test.164 Lacking ―imprisonment, banishment,
[and] death,‖ the continuing resolution could not be a bill of attainder as
classically defined.165 The court went further to dispel any correlation
between historical bills of attainder and the ―taint‖ and stigma suffered by
ACORN; such an effect of alienation was inconsequential in light of
Congress‘ ―authority to suspend federal funds to an organization that has
admitted to significant mismanagement.‖166
159. See id. at 299–300 (issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining Executive Branch
officials).
160. Brief for Appellants, ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos.
09-5172-cv, 10-992-cv), 2010 WL 3214690.
161. Emergency Stay, ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 095172-cv, 10-992-cv), available at
http://republicans.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/SecondCircuitOrderGrantingStay.pdf.
162. ACORN v. United States (ACORN II), 618 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2010).
163. Id. at 136.
164. See ACORN II, 618 F.3d at 137 (holding that the withdrawal of appropriations
―does not constitute a traditional form of punishment‖).
165. Id.
166. See id. (acknowledging that the appropriations ban may have caused some stigma
but rejecting the notion that Congress‘ exercise of its spending power was ―so
disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpunitive ends as to invalidate the
resulting legislation as a bill of attainder‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Sabri v.
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004); Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473
(1977))). Interestingly enough, while most of the Second Circuit‘s opinion concentrates on
Congress‘ appropriations power, the court bases some of its discussion on the related
Spending Clause. Nevertheless, for purposes of expressing the supremacy of Congress‘
appropriations power, any difference between the Spending Clause and the Appropriations
Clause is inapposite. Compare Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605 (establishing that ―Congress has
authority under the Spending Clause . . . to promote the general welfare, . . . and it has
corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . to see to it that taxpayer

Next, the court turned to ACORN‘s arguments on functional
punishment. There were three central arguments which ACORN made and
the court refuted in this regard: first, Congress‘ specific naming of
ACORN as a party to be excluded from federal funding was in itself
functional punishment;167 second, to target the unnamed affiliates of
ACORN would be functionally punishing those allied organizations;168 and
third, the bypassing of administrative procedures in imposing the funding
ban indicated functional punishment.169
In fairly efficient form, the court dismantled each argument in turn. The
court first rejected the idea that specificity alone could make the
withholding of appropriations an action of attainder.170 Congress, the court
reasoned, ―may single out an entity or person in its legislation.‖171 In
addition, the court observed, the targeting of unnamed allies and affiliates
of ACORN had the effect of hurting ACORN‘s case; leaving such groups
unnamed left room for federal agencies to determine who fell under the
appropriative ban, similar to a rule of general applicability permitted under
the Bill of Attainder Clause.172 Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the
notion that the circumvention of administrative procedures made the
appropriations ban punitive; the court, in light of the special nature of
congressional appropriations, declined to view such circumvention as
indicative of prohibited punishment.173
Observing that the congressional ban was neither historical nor
functional punishment, the court turned to the final prong of legislative
history and punitive motivation to determine whether the legislation could
be deemed a bill of attainder.174 The panel acknowledged that several
statements made by Members of Congress accusing ACORN of criminal
conduct could be potentially reflective of a legislative intent to punish, but
dollars . . . are . . . not frittered away in graft . . . .‖), with Office of Pers. Mgmt. v.
Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427 (1990) (explaining that Congress‘ appropriations power
―constitutes a most useful and salutary check upon . . . corrupt influence and public
peculation‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting STORY, supra note 28, § 1348)).
167. ACORN II, 618 F.3d at 139.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 139–40. This argument is founded upon a jurisdiction-specific observation
made by the Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir.
2002), where the court found that a law that bypassed administrative procedures to impose a
burden upon an entity would suggest that such legislation was imposing functional
punishment. Id. at 349. ACORN also made a fourth argument with respect to functional
punishment, premised on the notion that a favorable GAO investigation would not resolve
the funding ban. ACORN II, 618 F.3d at 139–40. This argument was summarily dismissed
by the court. Id.
170. ACORN II, 618 F.3d at 139.
171. Id. at 138 (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469–72).
172. Id. at 139.
173. Id. at 140.
174. Id. at 141.

declared that without a congressional finding of guilt,175 usually of the type
that follows a legislative trial,176 the ban against ACORN and its affiliates
could not be perceived as motivated by an unlawful punitive intent.177
Meeting none of the criteria required by what the Second Circuit
interpreted to be the post-Nixon bill of attainder test, the trial court‘s
injunction was vacated, and ACORN‘s funding ban was restored.178
III. ANALYSIS
ACORN presents the deceptively basic, yet truly complex, issue of
whether congressional defunding of a private organization constitutes a bill
of attainder—the answer to which has been described as ―generally elusive
and perhaps even illusory.‖179 Before analyzing whether the Bill of
Attainder Clause can be used to restrain the appropriations power of
Congress, we must first decipher the current landscape of the attainder
doctrine. There are two separate components that are essential in
understanding the Bill of Attainder Clause‘s interplay with the
Appropriations Clause; the Bill of Attainder Clause must be understood in
its application, and it must also be understood as a concept.
In terms of its application, as described in Part I, the Court has relied on
two radically different interpretations of the Bill of Attainder Clause: the
narrow, literalist, Frankfurterian approach, which focuses on the original
intent with respect to the prohibition against bills of attainder;180 and the
broad, functionalist, anti-Frankfurterian approach, where the notion of

175. Id. at 142.
176. But see id. (explaining that legislative trials do not consist of the only mechanism to
establish the high level of proof needed for unconstitutional punitive intent to be reflected in
the legislative record).
177. See id. (dismissing the statements made by legislators accusing ACORN of criminal
activity as insufficient to meet the threshold required by the Bill of Attainder Clause); see
also id. at 141 (declaring that a ―smattering‖ of statements by legislators ―do not constitute
[the required] unmistakable evidence of punitive intent‖ (alteration in original) (quoting
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 846 n.15 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). To buttress the notion that ACORN‘s mismanagement was at
the center of the appropriations ban, the court relied on an independent report commissioned
by ACORN named the ―Harshbarger Report,‖ which covered ACORN‘s mismanagement
leading up to and including the prostitution scandal.
See id. at
130–31.
178. Id. at 142.
179. Eugene Volokh, District Court Preliminarily Enjoins ACORN Defunding Law as a
Bill of Attainder, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 11, 2009, 9:38 PM),
http://volokh.com/2009/12/11/district-court-preliminarily-enjoins-acorn-defunding-law-asa-bill-of-attainder/.
180. See generally Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961) (rejecting a Communist registration requirement as a bill of attainder for lack of
specificity); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 329–30 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (advocating for a strict interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause as defined
by history).

punishment is open to wider interpretation.181 In addition, the Clause itself
has been justified by two different conceptual perspectives: as an
enshrinement of the separation of powers,182 and as an early guarantee of
due process.183
When a matter of legislative appropriations is viewed in light of the Bill
of Attainder Clause, much is revealed about both its conceptual limitations
and the proper mode of interpretation. First, the scenarios presented by
ACORN and other similar situations demonstrate that the functionalist
approach is unworkable, at least when viewing something as
constitutionally sacrosanct as the Appropriations Clause.184 Second, the
interplay between attainder and appropriations suggests that certain
conceptual views of the Bill of Attainder Clause, such as the notion that it
reinforces the separation of powers or that it is a guarantee of due process,
fail to advocate for the functionalist approach.185 Finally, the analysis
shows that only the originalist, Frankfurterian interpretation can conform to
the expectations of the Constitution.186
A. Of Funding and Punishment: The Failure of the Broad, Functionalist
Interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause
Despite the muddled history and interpretation of the Bill of Attainder
Clause, its gradual constitutional evolution has led to a test that evaluates
three primary factors to determine whether a legislative act truly constitutes
the prohibited punishment (aside from an obvious specificity
requirement).187 First, the bill may constitute ―historical attainder‖: the
imprisonment, banishment, and punitive confiscation of property

181. See generally Brown v. United States, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965) (permitting the
notion of punishment to include the prohibition of Communist Party members from being
union leaders); Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316 (widening the scope of the attainder laws to
encompass punishment via denial of appropriative funding); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 277, 324–25 (1866) (broadening the notion of punishment to include the
deprivation of employment from a priest); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377
(1866) (extending the punitive aspect of the Bill of Attainder Clause to include prohibiting
former Confederate officers from serving as attorneys).
182. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (describing the Bill of Attainder Clause as a
means of prohibiting legislative assumption of the ―judicial magistracy‖).
183. See generally Welsh, supra note 16, at 110–11 (advocating for the Bill of Attainder
Clause to function as a due process guarantee where a typical Fifth Amendment or
Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection claim would fail).
184. See discussion infra Part III.A (analyzing an appropriations ban through the current
attainder test and observing its ambiguity and inefficacy).
185. See discussion infra Part III.B, III.C (arguing that the separation of powers rationale
supports an abandonment of the current bill of attainder test and noting that the traditional
due process concerns do not apply to matters of legislative appropriations, respectively).
186. See discussion infra Part III.D (advocating for the adoption of a narrowed, literalist
interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause to avoid constitutional conflicts).
187. See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text.

historically accorded to attainted individuals.188 Second, the bill may also
contain ―functional‖ punishment; that is, if it serves to burden or deprive an
individual in a manner inconsistent with the Bill of Attainder guarantee,
then it may be deemed unconstitutional.189 Part of determining whether a
bill constitutes ―functional‖ punishment is determining whether it
reasonably serves to further nonpunitive goals.190 If it does not, then it is
easier to make a finding of functional punishment.191 Finally, the
legislative history of an act may also support a finding of attainder; if a
clear and unambiguous showing of punitive intent is shown on the part of
the legislature, then a law may properly be deemed a bill of attainder.192
On its surface and as a general rule of legal application, the law on bills
of attainder seems relatively straightforward. If there is either historically
recognized or modern, functional punishment, combined with a clear and
unambiguous showing of punitive intent, then the law is constitutionally
prohibited.193 But in fact, this approach is an awkward amalgam
encompassing both the literal, Frankfurterian school of thought and the
expansive, anti-Frankfurterian doctrine. It incorporates Frankfurter‘s belief
that the Bill of Attainder Clause is a ―very special‖ type of provision,
designed to be constrained by history, but also gives rise to a more flexible,
functional approach to defining ―punishment,‖ as seen in Brown.194
The constitutional conflict inherent in attempting to control the
appropriations power using the Bill of Attainder Clause is shown in a

188. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 474 (1977) (describing the
means of punishment as understood historically).
189. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 851
(1984) (noting that the inquiry as to punishment does not stop at a historical analysis of
punishment; a functional analysis must also be included).
190. See id. at 853–54 (explaining the role of legislative purpose as part of the calculus
of punishment).
191. See id. (describing the nonpunitive goals of the selective service requirement as
expressed through legislative history in holding that it did not constitute functional
punishment).
192. See, e.g., Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478 (highlighting that the third test of punishment is ―a
motivational one: inquiring whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to
punish‖); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (establishing that the
―clearest proof‖ is required to strike down a law as a Bill of Attainder).
193. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473–78 (listing the three prongs of the attainder/punishment
analysis and describing the role of the third prong of motivational punishment).
194. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321–22 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (describing the Bill of Attainder Clause as ―very special,‖ and limited to a
specific set of narrow circumstances as intended, where the legislature usurps the traditional
judicial function). A strong argument can be made that Lovett, Garland, and Cummings
constituted punishment in the traditional sense, as there are arguments to be made with
respect to deprivation of property. Although the means by which such deprivations took
place were uncommon and not necessarily thought of as judicial—such as the appropriations
act in Lovett or the loyalty oaths in Garland and Cummings—the net effect was an
occupational deprivation, something that can constitute a deprivation of livelihood and
property.

straightforward, post-Nixon and Selective Service analysis. As understood
historically, it seems clear that when Congress bars an organization from
being funded, it constitutes neither attainder nor a bill of pains and
penalties; the only conceivable argument that could be made is that the
withdrawal of appropriations constitutes a punitive confiscation of
property.195 The denial of appropriations, however, does not constitute the
taking of property because Congress is not imposing a fine or other
monetary penalty; rather, Congress is prohibiting further access to the
public coffers, denying a benefit it had previously bestowed.196 As the
Parliamentary history of both bills of attainder and bills of appropriation
demonstrates, the two have wholly separate origins, and the denial of a
right to funding can hardly be considered ―historical‖ punishment.197
But under the more nebulous, ―functional punishment‖ assessment, one
is more quickly inclined to believe that the deprivation of appropriation
could constitute a bill of attainder. After all, in accordance with Justice
Field‘s idea that the Constitution deals with ―substance, not shadows,‖ any
form of legislative contrivance could conceivably be a bill of attainder, so
long as there is a specific target and the net effect of the legislation imposes
a burden on an individual.198 In fact, the legislative device at issue in
Lovett was an appropriations bill that resulted in unlawful punishment
through the prohibition of funding, as seen in ACORN.199 Presumably,

195. See, e.g., Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474 (defining the traditional historical array of
punishment as including execution, imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive
confiscation of property (internal citations omitted)).
196. Compare Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, § 163,
123 Stat. 2023, 2053 (2009) (prohibiting any federal funding from being directed to
ACORN and its affiliates), with Memorandum from the Cong. Research Serv. to the House
Judiciary
Comm.
(Dec.
22,
2009),
available
at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?CRDC-ID=CRS-2009-CRS-0002 (showing a
congressionally-directed allocation of $140,000 to the New York ACORN program for
Juvenile Justice Programs through the Department of Justice).
197. See Bills of Attainder, supra note 23, at 79–81 (describing the typical reasons for a
Parliamentary bill of attainder or a bill of pains and penalties, as well as the procedure in
which such bills are passed); Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 1217–25 (explaining
the British origins of the appropriations power, from the Magna Carta to post-Revolutionary
England); see also LEVY, supra note 15, at 71 (establishing the history of the American
colonial use of bills of attainder, prior to the constitutionally-imposed ban).
198. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866) (condemning
the postbellum loyalty oaths for their specificity in presuming the guilt of priests and
clergymen and resulting deprivation of rights by ―legislative enactment‖).
199. Compare Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-132, § 304,
57 Stat. 431, 450 (―No part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund . . . shall be used . . . to
pay any part of the salary, or other compensation for the personal services, of Goodwin B.
Watson,
William
E.
Dodd,
Junior,
and
Robert
Morss
Lovett
. . . .‖), with Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010 § 163 (―None of the funds made
available by this joint resolution or any prior Act may be provided to the Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now . . . or any of its affiliates, subsidiaries, or allied
organizations.‖).

under this approach, any legislative deprivation could be sufficient to
constitute a bill of attainder so long as the specificity element is met.200
Compounding the problem is that every act of congressional
appropriations comes with the inherent assumption that the legislature is
acting on behalf of the general welfare of the country.201 This goes to the
nonpunitive intent aspect of the functional punishment analysis; if
appropriations bills are drafted in a manner that is based on
constitutionally-vested congressional judgments, then, according to the
functional punishment rationale, legislation concerning appropriations
could almost never constitute a bill of attainder as there will always be a
nonpunitive rationale present.202 The presumption can only be rebutted in
cases where the punitive intent for appropriations is overwhelming.203 This
underlying presumption of acting in the general welfare is especially salient

200. See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to
the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (1962) [hereinafter Ely] (noting that
some cases have established that any deprivation can amount to punishment). While the
aforementioned student comment is unsigned, the amici brief of a group of constitutional
law professors to the ACORN appeal notes that Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law
School confirmed Professor John Hart Ely‘s role in authoring the work as a student at Yale
Law School. See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8 & n.3, ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos.
09-5172-cv (L), 10-992-cv (CON)) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae] (citing Alan M.
Dershowitz, Visibility, Accountability and Discourse as Essential to Democracy: The
Underlying Theme of Alan Dershowitz’s Writing and Teaching, 71 ALB. L. REV. 731, 737 &
n.14 (2008)). Because of Professor Dershowitz‘s revelation, all subsequent references to
Ely‘s student unsigned comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested
Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause will be attributed to Ely and referred to as such.
The Ely Comment is significant in that it lays the modern foundation for functionalist
arguments that the Bill of Attainder Clause is to be broadly construed, with some arguing
that the Brown Court relied on the Ely Comment to attack the strict, narrow interpretation of
the Frankfurterian approach. E.g., Berger, supra note 13, at 379–80 (arguing that the Brown
Court‘s decision ―closely paraphrased [Ely‘s] position‖).
In light of Ely‘s expansive view of punishment, courts have warned that such a view has
the potential to unjustifiably constrict the powers of the legislature. E.g., Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (warning that ―all modern
legislation regulating the economic activities of specific groups might be considered
‗punishments,‘‖ and additionally observing that ―the bill of attainder clause, if read too
broadly, could be used to cripple the ability of legislatures to respond to some perceived
social or economic problem‖).
201. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990)
(describing the ―fundamental and comprehensive purpose‖ of the Appropriations Clause to
ensure that ―public funds will be spent according to the . . . judgments reached by Congress
as to the common good‖ (emphasis added)).
202. Cf. Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) (assuming that the
determination as to ―whether [a] present expenditure serves a public purpose‖ has been
made by the ―law-making department,‖ and as a result, the court will refuse to intervene
unless there is ―a plain case of departure from every public purpose which could reasonably
be conceived‖).
203. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 83
(1961) (asserting that the ―clearest proof‖ is necessary to strike down a law as a bill of
attainder, and in light of this, finding that the Communist registration requirements were not
―so lacking in consonance as to suggest a clandestine purpose‖ of punishment).

for corporations and organizations such as ACORN, who receive
appropriations with the expectation that Congress has ―the power to control
and direct the appropriations . . . [as] a most useful salutary check upon
profusion and extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public
peculation.‖204 If an attainder analysis demands that the ―clearest proof‖ of
punitive intent be offered,205 then the underlying supposition that all
appropriations acts are done for the sake of the public welfare, in both
commission and prohibition, bars such clarity from being delivered.
The final complexity arises from the third factor of the current attainder
analysis: a clear ―congressional intent to punish.‖206 Pegging the attainder
analysis on the legislative history of a particular provision treads on
dangerous terrain, especially for an appropriations bill. ―[T]o look for
congressional intent is to engage in anthropomorphism—to search for
something that cannot be found because it does not exist.‖207 Moreover,
legislative history can contradict itself; by premising attainder analysis on
it, judges can ―pick and choose those bits which support the result [they]
want to reach.‖208
Take, for example, the ACORN case. At the very least, the contrast
between the district court‘s decision and the reversal by the Second Circuit
highlights the vast inconsistency in interpreting the legislative record.209
The trial court cites several legislative accusations of criminality, most
notably Congressman Darrell Issa‘s publication of a report entitled, ―Is
ACORN Intentionally Structured as a Criminal Enterprise?‖210 In
discussing ACORN, legislators ran the gamut on reasons to punish the
organization,211 calling ACORN a facilitator of child prostitution,212 a
racketeering organization,213 and a ―reprehensible enterprise‖ engaged in

204. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 427 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1348 (3d ed. 1858)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
205. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
206. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 478–79 (1977).
207. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?,
31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998).
208. Id.
209. Compare ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d 285, 296–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the
statements made by various Members of Congress ―underline[d] the punitive nature of the
government‘s purportedly non-punitive reason‖), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 618 F.3d 125
(2d Cir. 2010), with ACORN II, 618 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to find a
punitive legislative intent despite the presence of the statements observed by the trial court
because ―there is no congressional finding of guilt‖).
210. ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 296–97.
211. See Brief of Appellant at 34, ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Nos. 09-5172-cv (L), 10-992-cv (CON)) (summarizing floor statements made regarding the
ACORN scandal).
212. 155 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Sep. 24, 2009) (statement of Rep. Bachman).
213. 155 CONG. REC. H9788 (daily ed. Sep. 22, 2009) (statement of Rep. Carter).

illegal activity.214 But proponents of the funding prohibition also supported
the bill out of a concern to ―defend taxpayers against waste, fraud, and
abuse.‖215 Deciphering the intent of any legislation, much less an
appropriations bill, can be a haphazard guess, making it practically
impossible to determine whether a sufficiently clear indication of punitive
intent exists.216 The Second Circuit correctly observed as much and, failing
to see the clarity demanded by the attainder analysis to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality,217 declined to find the legislative record
sufficient to support a punitive intent.218
In sum, applying the current bill of attainder test to a legislative act
prohibiting appropriative funding for one specific group demonstrates the
following. First, the withdrawal of appropriations can never be deemed a
―historical‖ punishment.219 Second, the broad understanding of what can
constitute ―functional punishment‖ includes the prospect of an
appropriations ban being punitive, but this notion is undercut by the fact
that legislatures have a legitimate rationale for spending (or withholding)
for the sake of the general welfare, thus having nonpunitive intent implied
with every appropriation made or taken away.220 Third, the legislative
history reveals at least some degree of conflict in terms of legislators‘
intent with respect to the prohibitive provision.221 In other words, the
modern test leaves us in paradoxical terrain.222 While the ACORN trial
court found that Congress legislated a bill of attainder through section

214. 155 CONG. REC. H9555 (daily ed. Sep. 16, 2009) (statement of Rep. Bilirakis).
215. 155 CONG. REC. S9517 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2009) (statement of Senator Johanns).
Indeed, the trial court cited this in its opinion, but misinterpreted it as a prohibited
expression of a punitive legislative intent. See ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 296. As
discussed below, in most instances, Congress may pass judgment on the misuse of federal
funds and withdraw funding accordingly, without being questioned by judicial oversight.
216. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (expressing that judicial
attempts to inquire into Congressional motives, beyond objective manifestations, make for
―a dubious affair indeed‖).
217. See, e.g., id.
218. See ACORN II, 618 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (comparing the legislative record
of ACORN to the secret trial held in Lovett and declaring that the ―smattering‖ of legislative
statements rhetorically indicting ACORN of criminal activity was insufficient to establish
―unmistakable evidence‖ of punitive intent).
219. See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 198–205 and accompanying text (questioning whether the
deprivation of appropriations can constitute ―functional punishment‖ in light of an inherent,
legitimate, nonpunitive purpose); see also Berger, supra note 13, at 358 (decrying the
comparison between legislation passed with ―Congress‘ salutary purpose‖ in mind and bills
of attainder as ―sanguinary hyperbole‖).
221. See supra notes 206–15 and accompanying text.
222. See Berger, supra note 13, at 358 (explaining that the expansive attainder test has
―engendered confusion, particularly in the attempt to define what constitutes ‗punishment‘
for purposes of a bill of attainder‖ (internal citations omitted)).

163,223 it just as easily could have interpreted the legislation another way,
as the Second Circuit did in the ACORN appeal.224 As the separation of
powers and due process rationales discussed below support, the current
test, while comprehensive, is a poor amalgam for determining what truly
constitutes a bill of attainder; a return to the narrow, originalist,
Frankfurterian approach is necessary to reestablish constitutional
tranquility.225
1.

Counterpoint: weighing the arguments for the preservation of the
functionalist approach
Several constitutional law scholars226 have strongly advocated for the
preservation of the functional, rather than the adoption of the formalistic,
approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause.227 Relying on the functionalist
language provided in Cummings,228 Lovett,229 and Brown,230 the scholars
conclude that an expansive analysis is necessary to ―look behind the literal
terms of a statute in assessing the permissibility of the legislative
regulation.‖231
The scholars‘ major contention is premised on Brown and Lovett, in that
the Bill of Attainder Clause bars the imposition of almost anything that
223. ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d 285, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010).
224. See generally ACORN II, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (declaring that Congress‘
appropriations ban against ACORN could not constitute a bill of attainder because it failed
to meet the three-pronged test for legislation).
225. See generally United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 319 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (characterizing his interpretation as a means of ―prevent[ing] collision between
Congress and Court‖).
226. These scholars include Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, along with Professors Bruce
Ackerman, David D. Cole, Michael C. Dorf, Mark Graber, Seth F. Kreimer, Sanford V.
Levinson, Burt Neuborne, and Stephen Vladeck. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at
1a–2a.
227. See id. at 1 (observing that the ―federal Bill of Attainder Clause ‗was intended not
as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an
implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against the legislative
exercise of the judicial function‘‖ (quoting United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 2
(1965))).
228. Id. at 9 (―The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows . . . .‖ (quoting
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866))).
229. Id. (―[L]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the
Constitution.‖ (alteration in brief) (emphasis added in brief) (quoting United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315–16 (1946))).
230. Id. at 10 (―[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was not to be given a narrow historical
reading (which would exclude bills of pains and penalties), but was instead to be read in
light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar: legislative punishment, of any form or
severity, of specifically designated persons or groups.‖ (quoting Brown, 381 U.S. at 447)).
But see Berger, supra note 13, at 369 & n.99 (accusing Chief Justices Warren and Burger of
inflating the dicta of Chief Justice Marshall‘s statement in Fletcher).
231. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 10.

could remotely be perceived as punishment.232 It is entirely possible,
however, that the scholars have read too much into the language of the
functionalist cases.233 In referring to the many forms of punishment that
can be presented, the Court has warned of the many creative legislative
paths that could potentially impose a traditionally judicial punishment on
an individual; this is, in fact, what the Bill of Attainder Clause guards
against.234 An expansive approach to the attainder prohibition sought to
prevent Congress from imposing fines, prison sentences, and other
traditionally judicial deprivations through crafty legislative methods that
imposed inconvenient, difficult, or impossible requirements on specific
individuals.235 The language of the functionalist cases could potentially be
aimed towards the problem of creative legislative drafting, and not
necessarily the burden or the perceived punishment of a particular bill.236
As discussed below, the separation of powers arguments accentuate the
notion that the attainder analysis should be limited to instances where
Congress metes out traditionally judicial punishments to single individuals,
and the definition of ―punishment‖ should be constrained.237
Assuming arguendo that the functionalist scholars (who served as amici
to the ACORN appeal) are correct in advocating for the functionalist
approach, there are still a number of unresolved issues. For one, there is no
demonstration as to how the deprivation of appropriations constitutes
―punishment.‖ While scholars suggest that the ―denial of eligibility for a
particular government benefit can constitute punishment within the
232. Id. at 13 (explaining that ―Lovett . . . stands for the proposition . . . that
‗punishment‘ in the context of bill of attainder analysis . . . [requires] simply the
legislature‘s imposition of any kind of punishment (for past conduct or behavior) on
specified persons‖).
233. In fact, it may be entirely possible that the attainder analysis presented by the
scholars is incomplete, failing to take into consideration (or deliberately omitting) the other
half of the attainder jurisprudence. It is interesting to note that the scholars, serving as amici
curiae in the ACORN appeal, do not cite a single literalist case in support of their argument.
234. Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 323–24 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the Framers intended for the prohibition against bills of
attainder to require the imposition of punishments typically found in historical bills of
attainder, e.g. death, or bills of pains and penalties).
235. For example, section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
at the center of Brown, barred Communists from serving in union leadership positions;
violation was met by a rather traditional punishment of a short prison sentence and/or a fine
of $10,000. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 438-39 (1965) (citing LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 504, 73 Stat.
519, 536).
236. See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. at 447 (―[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was not meant to
be given a narrow historical reading (which would exclude bills of pains and penalties), but
was instead to be read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar: legislative
punishment, of any form or severity . . . .‖ (emphasis added)).
But see Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322 (1866) (rejecting a narrowed
interpretation limiting punishment to the deprivation of life, liberty, and property).
237. See discussion infra Part III.B.

meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause,‖238 and cite the denial of
employment benefits in Lovett to buttress their theory,239 Flemming seems
more relevant and analogous, undercutting the functionalist rationale.240
Although scholars emphasize the role that Congress played in depriving
benefits over the actual nature of the benefits deprived in Lovett, it is
critical to note that the Flemming Court condoned the deprivation of
noncontractual governmental benefits as an appropriative matter beyond
the ambit of traditional judicial punishment.241 Thus, the scholars‘ claim
that Lovett and its progeny simply require ―the legislature‘s imposition of
any kind of punishment (for past conduct and behavior)‖242 is tenuous, only
ambiguously supported by the case law, and ignores the other
Frankfurterian half of attainder jurisprudence.243
B. Attainder Versus Appropriations: A Murky Separation of Powers
One of the primary conceptual rationales behind the Bill of Attainder
Clause is that it serves as a guardian of the separation of powers, premised
on the notion ―that no single body can alone effectuate the total policy of
government.‖244 The Framers were concerned about the legislative power
becoming too great and being tyrannically exercised over individuals in
scenarios where the judiciary should be playing the primary role.245 To
commentators such as the late Professor John Hart Ely, the Bill of
Attainder Clause serves as the inverse, legislative analogue to the Article
III cases and controversies requirement—a constitutional barrier preventing
Congress from crossing over into the terrain of the judiciary.246

238. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 12.
239. See id. (noting that the Lovett Court held the legislative barring of ―government
funds to pay three specified government employees determined by the House to have
engaged ‗subversive activity‘‖ constituted a prohibited bill of attainder (citing United States
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313–17 (1946))).
240. Flemming dealt with the Social Security system and deemed the program an
enactment ―pursuant to Congress‘ power to spend money in aid of the general welfare.‖
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609 (1960) (citations omitted). Arguably, directed
congressional appropriations are a benefit similar to social security, enacted for the general
welfare.
241. See id. at 617 (dismissing the sanction of social security benefits as ―the mere denial
of a noncontractual governmental benefit‖).
242. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 13.
243. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 (assessing the denial of governmental benefits as a
―mere denial‖ not within the scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause); see also Lovett, 328
U.S. at 330 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that the blocking of federal funds for the
employment of the plaintiffs was not punishment per se, but a contractual issue of pay).
244. Ely, supra note 200, at 343.
245. See id. at 344 (establishing the Framers‘ concerns over the ―dangers of the
combined exercise of the legislative and adjudicatory functions‖).
246. See id. at 347 (explaining in detail how Article III prohibits encroachment on the
rulemaking abilities of Article I, and how the Bill of Attainder Clause prevents
encroachment into the specific application of law as typically prescribed by the judiciary).

But the separation of powers argument falters when the Bill of Attainder
Clause is injected into the appropriations process. Appropriations, by their
very nature, are legislated with specificity.247 Congress‘ power to
appropriate is absolute;248 the executive answers to the conditions of the
legislature and the judiciary is in no position to play the legislature‘s role,
making the power to appropriate an anomalous one in the context of
separation of powers concerns.249
Moreover, as Ely notes, the Bill of Attainder Clause was meant to
prohibit trials by legislature; the worries over legislative punishment are
ancillary to the primary concerns of legislative usurpation.250 But as
Richmond and other cases dealing with the Appropriations Clause suggest,
Congress frequently undertakes legislative judgments with respect to the

247. See, e.g., Earmarks, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
http://earmarks.omb.gov/earmarks-public/ (last updated Nov. 12, 2010)
(describing earmarks as ―funds provided by the Congress for projects, programs, or grants
where purported congressional direction . . . specifies the location or recipient‖ (emphasis
added)). But cf. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 217 (3d
ed. 2007) (explaining that whereas traditionally, ―authorizing legislation rarely specified
amounts authorized to be appropriated,‖ the current practice utilizes specific amounts of
authorization). Unsurprisingly, the first appropriations bill was much broader, using four
lump sums to cover all of the government‘s expenditures: ―$216,000 for the civil list,
$137,000 for the War Department, $190,000 to discharge warrants issued by the previous
Board of Treasury, and $96,000 for pensions to disabled veterans.‖ LOUIS FISHER, THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS, 1789–1993, at 4 (2003) (citation omitted). The Second
Circuit recognized the significance of the special nature of appropriations in its decision.
See ACORN II, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that, while the bypassing of
administrative procedures could conceivably support the notion that a particular piece of
legislation is a bill of attainder, the ―inference is difficult to draw
. . . when a congressional appropriations law is at issue‖).
248. See Hart‘s Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880) (―The absolute control of the moneys of
the United States is in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great
power only to the people.‖), aff’d, 118 U.S. 62 (1886). But see New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (limiting Congress‘ ability to place conditions on spending for the
States by requiring ―some relationship‖ between the conditions placed and ―the purpose of
federal spending‖). Arguably, the case is inapposite, as New York had Tenth Amendment
implications not present in Congress‘ appropriations and spending powers vis-à-vis federal
agencies and individual organizations; therefore, Congress‘ appropriations power remains
supreme in the non-state regard. See id. (raising concerns over federal funds influencing a
State‘s legislative choices).
249. See Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945)
(observing that the terms and conditions in which Congress makes appropriations ―is a
matter solely in [its] hands,‖ compelling compliance by the executive branch and shielding
appropriative acts from interference by the judiciary); cf. Ely, supra note 200, at 344
(detailing the traditional concerns of an unrestrained legislature in light of a limited
executive and judicial branch). In fact, some, such as Raoul Berger, speculated that the
Court‘s expansive ―transmutation‖ of the Bill of Attainder Clause ―invaded the
policymaking
functions
of
the
state
and
federal
legislatures.‖
See Berger, supra note 13, at 356.
250. See Berger, supra note 13, at 402–03 (explaining that the purpose of the Bill of
Attainder Clause was to preserve the separation of powers, and ―not to prevent legislative
‗punishment,‘ but to prevent legislative trial‖ (quoting Ely, supra note 200, at 356) (internal
quotations omitted)).

propriety of appropriations and their applicability to the general welfare.251
It is not a ―trial‖ in the sense of the judicial term, but appropriations
committees have the power to summon witnesses and receive testimony in
a manner similar to that seen in judicial trials.252 Congress, as a matter of a
constitutionally vested right,253 passes judgment over the worthiness of an
appropriative endeavor and,254 exercising that judgment, similarly has the
ability to prohibit funds from reaching certain entities.255
Lovett, however, poses an interesting issue. The case involves a
legislative appropriations act that imposed a prohibition similar to the one
in ACORN.256 To declare that Congress may prohibit ACORN‘s funding
but is prohibited from effectively terminating the employment of
potentially treasonous government employees yields two inconsistent
outcomes in two similar scenarios.
Two distinctions make the dichotomous reality possible. The first
distinction concerns the type of person targeted by the respective statutes—
the employees in Lovett were individuals, not corporations.257 It has been
undeniable since the early Bill of Attainder Clause jurisprudence that
individuals were intended to be protected from the exercise of what Story
might have called the ―legislative magistracy.‖258 But the separation of
powers analysis for attainder becomes confusing with the recognition of
corporations as potential subjects of bills of attainder.259 As a matter of
251. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990)
(perceiving the ―fundamental and comprehensive purpose‖ of the Appropriations Clause as
a means of assuring ―that public funds will be spent according to the letter of the difficult
judgments reached by Congress as to the common good‖ (emphasis added)).
252. See generally H. COMM ON APPROPRIATIONS, 111TH CONG., COMMITTEE RULES
(2009), available at
http://appropriations.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=263&Ite
mid=34 (outlining the procedural privileges of committee members during appropriations
hearings, including the summoning of witnesses and the submission of evidence).
253. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (articulating that ―[n]o money shall be
drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law‖); Figley &
Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 1239 (contending that ―the Appropriations Clause enshrined
this legislative supremacy by vesting the ‗power of the purse‘ in Congress‖).
254. See, e.g., Carmichael v. S. Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937)
(explaining that the judgment as to ―whether the present expenditure serves a public purpose
is a practical question addressed to the law-making department‖).
255. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 427. In fact, the use of limitation language, as seen in
section 163, is not uncommon in appropriations legislation. See SCHICK, supra note 247, at
268, 270 (contrasting the legitimate use of limitation language in appropriations laws under
House Rule XXI and Senate Rule XVI with the prohibited insertion of substantive law).
256. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
257. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 304 (1946).
258. Cf. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (establishing that ―[a] bill of
attainder may affect the life of an individual‖ and that the legislature‘s power in that respect
―over the lives and fortunes of individuals [was] expressly restrained‖ (emphasis added)).
259. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 346–47 (2d Cir. 2002)
(declaring the Bill of Attainder Clause not to be just a personal, individual guarantee and
permitting the Clause to be applied to corporations). It is interesting to note that the Second

political reality, individual employees such as the ones involved in Lovett
do not have the practical ability or need to lobby Congress for
appropriations funding; organizations such as ACORN do have such
abilities and needs.260 Thus, federal government employees are far less
likely to be subjected to the mercy and whims of the complex
appropriations process, whereas an organization such as ACORN should be
aware of the possibility of defunding.
The second distinction hones in on the legislative process and net effect
of the statutes. In Lovett, the first step to defunding the employment of the
three individuals was Congress generally deeming ―subversion‖ an activity
worthy of terminating employment.261 Such a general rule, however ad hoc
it may have been, was perfectly within Congress‘ ambit to generate.262 But
the task of specifying who was subversive—a perceivably criminal
classification—typically was expected of the judiciary; with criminal laws,
the legislature is only permitted to proclaim the overarching rules for
society.263 Instead, Congress usurped the judiciary‘s role by deeming
Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Jr., and Robert M. Lovett as
subversives and instituting the penalty of unemployment.264
With ACORN, Congress did not legislate a new crime and pronounce
ACORN to be guilty.265 Rather, in its general power of eliminating the
corrupt use of appropriations,266 it made a deliberate decision to prohibit
the use of federal funding. It may have passed judgment to render its
decision, and some of that may have entailed accusations of criminal
activity, but these are judgments that Congress is permitted to make

Circuit understood the uncertainty of whether this determination was appropriate; aside
from citing loose dicta from several Supreme Court decisions and the ―implied assumption‖
that the Clause would apply to corporations in other circuits, the Second Circuit had very
little jurisprudential support. See id. at 347 (―The applicability of the Bill of Attainder
Clause to corporations remains unsettled in every circuit.‖).
260. Cf. Transmittal from the Congressional Research Service to the House Judiciary
Committee (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://web.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/attachment/a.pdf?_m=1bce2f7d9c8304140e1d07e1a72d0f92&wchp=
dGLbVlb-zSkSA&_md5=05f2f8c680d6e685525c364fd6ade6e1&ie=a.pdf
(summarizing
ACORN‘s activities in Congress to ―promote affordable housing and assist the homeless‖).
261. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316.
262. See, e.g., Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136 (establishing that ―[i]t is the peculiar
province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society,‖ and to
leave the application of the rules to ―other departments‖).
263. See id.
264. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316.
265. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, § 163, 123
Stat. 2023, 2053 (2009) (preventing the disbursal of federal funds for ACORN). The
legislation did not contain any congressional findings of criminal guilt.
266. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427 (1990) (endorsing
the full use of the appropriations power to check against ―corrupt influence and public
peculation‖).

without the usurpation of judicial authority.267 In fact, permitting the
judiciary to control the appropriations process is a greater contravention of
the separation of powers than an appropriations bill can be perceived as
being invasive of the judicial power.268
C. The Inapplicability of the Due Process Rationale
The second conceptual rationale behind the Bill of Attainder Clause is
that it serves as an early guarantee of due process.269 This notion is closely
intertwined with the separation of powers rationale, but can be
distinguished. More specifically, the due process query is whether the
courts ―need only ask if the manner in which the legislature is attempting to
accomplish its purpose is proper.‖270 This goes to the heart of Justice
Story‘s condemnation of the legislative usurpation of the ―judicial
magistracy.‖271 Whereas the separation of powers rationale focuses on the
usurpation itself as a matter of governmental structure, the due process
argument focuses on the protections accorded to an individual.272
The concept of the Bill of Attainder Clause as a due process guarantee
only serves to further the notion that the Clause cannot serve to restrain the
Congressional appropriations process in its full exercise, whether through
the commission or prohibition of funding. The prohibition against attainder
can only extend to situations where ―the protections of a judicial trial‖
would be anticipated for an individual.273
In the appropriations arena, no process needs to be accorded to private
organizations; the discretion of deliberation and ―process‖ is solely vested
in the hands of the legislature,274 and Congress can make either a
267. Id. at 427–28 (noting that Congress‘ determinations regarding appropriations
require ―difficult judgments‖).
268. See Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 1252 (explaining that there is ―no
warrant‖ to believe that the judiciary ever had the power to compel an appropriation).
269. Cf. Welsh, supra note 16, at 102 (proposing that, as ―an absolute constitutional
prohibition against trial by legislature,‖ the Bill of Attainder Clause is ―a guarantee of
process‖ (citations omitted)).
270. Id. at 103–04.
271. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (describing bills of attainder as a
pronunciation of guilt without ―any of the common forms and guards of trial‖).
272. Compare United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (viewing the Bill of
Attainder Clause as ―an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard
against legislative exercise of the judicial function‖), with BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d
58, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Bill of Attainder Clause
ensured the preservation of ―the factfinding and due process protections of trial in an Article
III court‖).
273. See Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977) (identifying the
legislative determination of guilt and the infliction of punishment ―without provision of the
protections of a judicial trial‖ as essential elements to make a bill of attainder (emphasis
added)).
274. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 253 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(―[T]he legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some

comprehensive inquiry or no inquiry at all as to whether an appropriation
should be commissioned or prohibited.275 The Supreme Court has
recognized as much and granted an almost-universal deference to Congress
in making decisions on appropriations, especially as to who should receive
them and for what purpose they should do so.276 As the Court in Richmond
noted, it is for Congress to reach the ―difficult judgments . . . as to the
common good,‖ and the appropriations process should not be left to ―the
individual favor of Government agents or the individual pleas of
litigants.‖277
But much like the issues raised by Lovett with respect to the separation
of powers rationale, it is unclear how the three employees in that particular
case fell outside the appropriative realm, thereby justifying constitutional
intervention by the due process rationale of the Bill of Attainder Clause.
After all, it can easily be said that the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations
Act of 1943 merely served to prohibit funds, used for the general welfare,
from going to suspected subversive individuals.278
The key in distinguishing Lovett from cases like ACORN is that
individuals are not the immediate beneficiaries of Congressional
appropriations279 and are not expected to be part of its process as
recipients.280 In rescinding and placing conditions on appropriations,
constitutions full discretion . . . .‖); see also Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp.
985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (observing that the judiciary is forbidden from interfering with
―the exclusive powers of Congress‖ in appropriation matters and that the executive is
compelled to comply with Congress‘ exercise of such powers).
275. Cf. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440–41 (1896) (explaining that
Congress is the only branch of government where ―any application [of claims and debts
may] be successfully made‖ and an entity‘s ―recognition depends solely upon congress, and
whether it will recognize claims thus founded must be left to the discretion of that body‖
(emphasis added)).
276. See, e.g., Carmichael v. S. Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) (declaring
inquiries as to ―whether [an] expenditure serves a public purpose [to be] a practical question
addressed to the law-making department,‖ and requiring ―a plain case of departure from
every public purpose . . . to justify the intervention of a court‖); see also John W. BrabnerSmith, Judicial Limitations on Federal Appropriations, 25 VA. L. REV. 659, 661 (1939)
(hypothesizing that the Court‘s intervention in matters of appropriations would ―suspend[]‖
and ―disorganize[]‖ the entire appropriations process).
277. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990).
278. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 306 (1946) (referring to the federal
government‘s argument that the appropriations ban was a valid exercise of the ―general
Welfare‖ phrase of the Appropriations Clause).
279. But see Priv. L. No. 100-38, §§ 1–2, 102 Stat. 4860, 4860–61 (1988) (granting sums
to individuals totaling $101,622). Even under such rare circumstances, Congress acts on its
own volition to grant an individual an appropriation for the sake of remediating an error or
wrong, not to grant an undeserved financial windfall. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 431
(explaining that Private Law 100-38 was passed because the servicemen listed ―joined [the]
wrong retirement plan in reliance on erroneous advice‖).
280. In theory, there is no explicit bar to individuals being the recipient of
appropriations. After all, the early American tradition ―was to adjudicate each individual
money claim against the United States‖. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 430. However, there are
several suggestions that such a prohibition is now in place. First, with respect to the

Congress cannot implicate actors who otherwise would not play any role in
Congress‘ funding of the general welfare. Further, the appropriations
power in Lovett was used to prevent the three individuals from practicing
their profession as employees of the United States government; this is a
deprivation of a right to property—specifically, employment—that the
Court has strongly recognized as one that is to be protected by judicial
process.281 In contrast, when such liberties are not at stake, courts have
been extremely hesitant to inject themselves into the process of
congressional appropriations.282
Through the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Framers intended to protect
individuals from the capricious whims of legislatures wishing to impose a
punishment that could only otherwise be accorded through a judicial
trial.283 The Clause was not meant to inject judicial notions of due process
into processes where a judicial trial would be constitutionally
unwarranted.284
Due process is only invoked through the Bill of Attainder Clause in
cases where, absent laws involving the deprivation of life or liberty,285
Constitution, the related Spending Clause suggests that Congress must ―provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.‖ U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl.
1. (emphasis added). Second, case law seems to validate the notion that the Court will defer
to Congress on spending matters, so long as the power is being used for the sake of the
general welfare. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (delineating
Congress‘ ―authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal moneys to promote
the general welfare‖ (emphasis added)); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936)
(agreeing with the Hamiltonian view that ―Congress . . . has a substantive power . . . to
appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the
general welfare of the United States‖ (emphasis added)). Finally, practical considerations
and a look to the current operation of the appropriations process seems to suggest that even
within the scope of earmarking, the process promotes spending for organizational projects,
not appropriations to individuals. Cf. SCHICK, supra note 247, at 245, 247 (providing
examples of home district projects requested through the earmarking process in a 2006
appropriations bill and instructing earmark requesters to identify recipient organizations in
their requests).
281. See generally Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (discussing the
prohibition of employment as a priest without a loyalty oath as a bill of attainder and a
deprivation of property in the form of employment); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333 (1866) (discussing the same in the context of employment as an attorney).
282. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (explaining that the
inquiries to the ―wisdom or unwisdom‖ of a congressional scheme of benefits ―must come
from Congress, not the courts‖); id. at 617 (warning that ―[j]udicial inquiries into
Congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter‖).
283. See STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (illustrating occasions where the legislature
would pass bills of attainder ―in times of rebellion . . . or [] violent political excitement‖ and
in doing so, would be most vulnerable to ―trampl[ing] upon the rights and liberties of
others‖).
284. Cf. Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that the Due Process Clause, working in
conjunction with the Bill of Attainder Clause, does not give ―an unwarranted power of
intrusion into local affairs‖ where a local government makes decisions of employment in
part by inquiring about political affiliation).
285. Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473–74 (1977).

Congress legislatively deprives an individual of his property286—and by
extension, his livelihood.287 In those instances, an individual should enjoy
―the common forms and guards of trial‖ and be able to answer against the
reasons motivating such deprivation in an environment where the
―formality of proof‖ is required ―in the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings.‖288 But the Constitution recognizes no role for the judiciary
to play in the deliberation of appropriations;289 therefore, the protections
that accompany a judicial trial are similarly inapplicable when Congress
makes its appropriative decisions.290 It is hard to imagine that the
deprivation of congressional appropriations, arguably a ―noncontractual
government benefit,‖ can be deemed a deprivation of property barred by
the Bill of Attainder Clause.291 Moreover, even if the protections of a trial
were available to determine whether the withdrawal of appropriations was
lawful, a court would be powerless to compel Congress to provide a
remedy in re-appropriating funds.292 Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that
the limited due process rationale behind the Bill of Attainder Clause reveals
that the Clause was not meant to constrain the congressional appropriations
power.
1.

Counterpoint: preventing attainder by demanding congruence and
proportionality
Interestingly, the ACORN appeal‘s academic amici, in advocating for a
strong functionalist approach, call for the adoption of a standard of review
286. Id. at 474 (explaining that the ―punitive confiscation of property‖ is prohibited by
the Bill of Attainder Clause).
287. E.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866) (declaring that a
clergyman‘s deprivation of employment through the imposition of a loyalty oath is ―within
the inhibition of the Federal Constitution‖); see also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
316–17 (1946) (announcing that the Constitution does not permit Congress to sentence
individuals ―to perpetual exclusion from any government employment‖).
288. See STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (condemning the legislature‘s assumption of the
―judicial magistracy‖ as an ―irresponsible despotic discretion‖).
289. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990) (explaining
that the ―difficult judgments . . . as to the common good‖ and the spending of ―public funds‖
is reached by Congress); Hart‘s Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880) (placing absolute control
of public funds in the hands of Congress, noting that ―Congress is responsible . . . only to
the people‖), aff’d, 118 U.S. 62 (1886).
290. See Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) (leaving the
appropriative decision-making process entirely to Congress as a ―practical question
addressed to the lawmaking department‖); cf. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617
(1960) (deeming judicial inquiries of congressional motives ―a hazardous matter‖).
291. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 609–10 (observing that social security benefits are
noncontractual government benefits); id. at 617 (expressing that ―the mere denial of a
noncontractual governmental benefit‖ is not a punishment that runs afoul of the Bill of
Attainder Clause).
292. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850) (explaining that even if
there is a claim or judgment against the United States, if Congress has not made an
appropriation, then the claim ―cannot and should not be paid by the Treasury‖).

akin to the congruence and proportionality test applied in City of Boerne v.
Flores293 in lieu of the rational basis approach.294 The amici have
substantial jurisprudential support for their position, relying on legal
conclusions made by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit295 as well as dicta from the Supreme Court‘s more recent
attainder jurisprudence.296 The scholars‘ standard would make the mere
existence of a nonpunitive rationale insufficient to satisfy the attainder
inquiry as they claim the ―nonpunitive purpose must itself support the
singling out of the targeted individuals or groups.‖297
Harmonizing an attainder analysis with a congruence and proportionality
test certainly has its appeal. It would ensure that Congress, in passing bills
targeted at specific individuals or groups, would have to demonstrate a
legitimate, nonpunitive purpose that outweighs the magnitude of the burden
imposed, thus requiring some form of ―legislative‖ process.298
Unfortunately, when applied to bills involving congressional
appropriations (or the withholding thereof), the congruence and
proportionality test is unfeasible, if not unconstitutional.299 Subjecting
appropriative legislation to this level of judicial scrutiny would intrude
upon the province of Congress; the legislature alone has the discretion to
determine whether ―wisdom or unwisdom‖ resides in its appropriative
decisions.300 Only when the legislature clearly imposes a traditionally
293. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The congruence and proportionality test, as established in
Boerne, dealt with Congress‘ enforcement powers under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 519. Because Congress‘ power under section five was limited to
remedial measures, the Court required legislation enacted through Congress‘ section five
power to have ―congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.‖ Id. at 519–20.
294. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 14–15.
295. Id. (―[C]ourts require the government to show ‗the need for a legitimate nonpunitive
purpose and a rational connection between the burden imposed and [the] nonpunitive
purposes of the legislation.‘‖ (second alteration in original) (quoting Foretich v. United
States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2003))).
296. Id. at 15 (―In such cases [involving the Bill of Attainder Clause], [courts] look
beyond simply a rational relationship of the statute to a legitimate public purpose for ‗less
burdensome alternatives by which [the] legislature . . . could have achieved its legitimate
nonpunitive objectives.‘‖ (quoting Con. Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 350 (2d Cir.
2002))).
297. Id. at 16.
298. See id. at 17 (explaining that if there is a ―‗significant imbalance between the
magnitude of the burden imposed and a purported nonpunitive purpose, the statute‘ . . . is . .
. an unconstitutional bill of attainder‖ (quoting Foretich, 351 F.3d at 1221)).
299. See Carmichael v. S. Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) (requiring that
judicial intervention in appropriative matters contain a prerequisite of ―a plain case of
[legislative] departure from every public purpose which could reasonably be conceived‖—
arguably, a rational basis standard (emphasis added)); see also Smith v. Government of the
Virgin Islands, 329 F.2d 135, 143–44 (3d Cir. 1964) (observing that the ―plain case of
departure‖ standard established in Carmichael is a ―well-settled principle[]‖ of law).
300. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (declining to evaluate the
―wisdom or unwisdom‖ of Congressional deprivations of social security, concluding that

judicial form of punishment should judicial due process be afforded.301 A
Boerne-type scrutiny is also unpalatable when comparing the history and
treatment of section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Appropriations Clause; section five is limited in scope and Congress must
take caution not to exceed its discretion under it,302 whereas Congress has
been accorded near limitless deference in its appropriative decisions.303
Thus, as tempting as the employment of a congruence and proportionality
test is to ensure some semblance of process, such a standard of scrutiny is
incompatible with the deference owed to the legislature.
D. A More Specific Purpose: Returning to the Originalist Interpretation
With the current test in disarray, and the doctrines of separation of
powers and due process supporting the notion that the Bill of Attainder
Clause was not meant to constrain the appropriations power, there is only
one analytical structure that the Court could employ to properly assess
further challenges based on the Bill of Attainder Clause. This mode of
analysis does not require reinvention, but rather the contemporary choosing
of a side; by returning to Justice Frankfurter‘s test that treats the Bill of
Attainder Clause as a ―very special‖ constitutional organism, the
constitutional ―collision‖ feared by the literalists can be avoided.304
Admittedly, the precise contours of Justice Frankfurter‘s approach have
not been fully defined. However, his judicial philosophy makes clear that a
true bill of attainder requires at least three elements: the specification of
both an offense and an individual,305 a declaration of guilt,306 and

―[t]he answer to such inquiries must come from Congress, not the courts‖ (quoting
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
301. E.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946) (declaring a statute that
effectively denied three individuals the right to paid employment is an unconstitutional bill
of attainder); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 316, 332 (1866) (striking down
a Missouri statute requiring an anti-Confederate loyalty oath to practice a vocation and be
gainfully employed).
302. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (explaining that the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s history supports the idea that the Enforcement Clause was
intended to be used as a limited, remedial device, rather than as a means of changing the
substance of constitutional rights).
303. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990) (explaining
that the Court defers to Congress ―to assure that public funds will be spent according to the
letter of the difficult judgments reached by Congress as to the common good‖).
304. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 319, 322 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (identifying a ―very
special, narrowly restricted, intervention by the legislature‖ as the evil of which the
Constitution sought to proscribe through the Bill of Attainder Clause).
305. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 86 (1961).
306. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 322–23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (observing that
traditionally, a bill of attainder always contained ―a declaration of guilt either of the
individual or the class to which he belonged‖).

punishment for a past offense.307 This set of guidelines maintains the
separation of powers by reserving the conduct of trials to our judicial
system, leaving the legislature to promulgate the rules that courts may
interpret to deem offense and punishment.308 Moreover, it conforms more
closely with the notion that the Framers, in adding the Bill of Attainder
Clause to our Constitution, knew exactly what bills of attainder actually
were meant to be,309 and did not intend to pit one constitutional provision
against the other.310
Absent from the originalist dialogue, however, is proper consideration of
what could constitute ―punishment‖ as prohibited by the Bill of Attainder
Clause.
ACORN has properly demonstrated how the functionalist
definition of ―punishment‖ can stretch too far and infringe upon a
constitutionally vested power that the Court repeatedly has recognized to
be solely within Congress‘ ambit.311 But little has been said about what the
proper scope of punishment is under the literalist approach. In response to
Ely‘s initial observations regarding the Bill of Attainder Clause, Professor
Raoul Berger suggested a radically literal interpretation limiting the
punishment aspect of the Clause to include only those resulting in death.312
This, however, seems entirely incongruent with the most fundamental
principles of the Court‘s interpretation of the Clause,313 and moreover,
seems unreasonable in light of the separation of powers arguments.314
307. See id. at 323 (connecting the Bill of Attainder Clause to the Ex Post Facto Clause
and explaining that the function of both was to prevent punishment for past offenses).
308. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (tasking the
legislature with the prescription of ―general rules for the government of society‖ while
leaving the interpretation of such laws to ―other departments‖).
309. See, e.g., Lovett, 328 U.S. at 321 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (explaining that the
nature of the Bill of Attainder Clause was very specific, and ―[t]hese specific grievances and
the safeguards against their recurrence were not defined by the Constitution‖ but ―by
history‖); Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 430–31 (1868) (Mason, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that the Framers understood the ―established and technical signification‖ of
bills of attainder within the unique framework of the Constitution); see also Berger, supra
note 13, at 361 (examining Justice Story‘s constitutional commentaries for inferences that
the Framers wrote the Constitution with common law constructs, including those concerning
attainder, in mind).
310. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 319 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (―[E]very rational trail must
be pursued to prevent collision between Congress and Court.‖).
311. See discussion supra Part III.B (analyzing the unconstitutional effects of attempting
to restrain the congressional appropriations power with the Bill of Attainder Clause).
312. See Berger, supra note 13, at 364 (rejecting the idea that the Framers would employ
the phrase ―bills of attainder‖ to include the ―quite different ‗bills of pains and penalties‘‖).
313. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866) (―Within the
meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties.‖);
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138 (noting that a bill of attainder may impact ―the life of an
individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both‖); see also Drehman v. Stifle, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 595, 601 (1869) (describing the Bill of Attainder Clause as ―generical[] and
embrac[ing] bills of both [pains and penalties and attainder] classes‖).
314. Even Justice Frankfurter recognized that the Bill of Attainder Clause enshrined the
divorce of the judicial function from the legislative branch, and recognized that as such,

Rather, the proper scope of punishment should be limited to ―historical
punishments‖ traditionally meted out by the judiciary, encompassing both
bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties.315 Such punishments
include imprisonment,316 banishment,317 the punitive confiscation of
property,318 and a bar to employment.319 This would address the
functionalist concern that a hyper-technical interpretation of the Clause
would ―outmode‖ the necessity of the Clause,320 which should serve as a
meaningful restraint of legislative power321 while preventing
unconstitutional intrusion into the domains of other branches.322
Advocates of the more expansive, functionalist approach, such as
Professor Ely, question whether the literalist approach is viable.323 Ely
contends that any attempt to ground the attainder clause in history would
lead to an ―abortive‖ endeavor, and had the Framers truly intended to
constrain the attainder clause with history‘s definition, they would have
done so by giving the term bill of attainder ―specific content.‖324 A
functionalist Court would likely agree.325
However, the separation of powers guarantee that Ely and others seek
through their expanded view of the Bill of Attainder Clause also would

―[t]he Constitution outlaws this entire category of [bills of attainder and bills of pains and
penalties].‖ Lovett, 328 U.S. at 324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
315. E.g., Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473–75 (1977) (elaborating on
the historical definition of punishment and providing examples of traditional punitive
measures under the Bill of Attainder Clause).
316. Id. at 474.
317. In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 F. 437, 439 (C.C.D. Or. 1888) (―A legislative act which
undertakes to inflict the . . . banishment or exile from the United States on a citizen thereof .
. . is a bill of attainder‖). But see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)
(rejecting the concept that deportation is punishment for a crime, explaining that ―[i]t is not
a banishment . . . but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien‖).
318. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 852
(1984).
319. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474 (―Our country‘s own experience with bills of attainder
resulted in the addition of another sanction . . . : a legislative enactment barring designated
individuals . . . from participation in specified employments or vocations . . . .‖).
320. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (expressing concern over the
narrow, technical interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause and explaining that the
Clause was not designed to be ―outmoded‖ quickly after its inception).
321. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (restraining the legislature
from passing bills of attainder that ―affect the life of an individual, or . . . confiscate his
property, or . . . do both‖).
322. See discussion supra Part III.B (using the ACORN case to demonstrate the potential
clash between the Congressional appropriations power and the Bill of Attainder Clause
under an expansive, functionalist approach).
323. See generally Ely, supra note 200, at 340–43 (explaining the impossibility of the
Frankfurterian approach).
324. Id. at 342.
325. See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 (―The best available evidence, the writings of the
architects of our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was
intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition . . . .‖).

include a danger of creating new issues of supremacy.326 Combined with
the fact that other constitutional guarantees can protect individual citizens
from the concerns that motivate such an expansive interpretation,327 there is
an extant need to steer the attainder laws back to a path of originalism,
literalism, and strict interpretation.
CONCLUSION
If anything is certain about the intent and proper interpretation of the Bill
of Attainder Clause, it is that much uncertainty still exists. Interjecting the
Appropriations Clause into the attainder analysis suggests that the current
interpretations are unreliable, at best. But keeping the attainder doctrine on
its current path will resolve nothing; at its core, it is an awkward
compromise between two polarized, irreconcilable approaches. Our
interpretation of this sparsely used, yet integral, provision of the
Constitution is in true need of revision; the only viable reconciliation is to
restore and refine the originalist, Frankfurterian interpretation of the Bill of
Attainder Clause.
As for ACORN itself, Congress acted properly in withdrawing its
funding and prohibiting additional federal funds from reaching the group.
In terms of responding quickly (and perhaps irrationally) to a political
crisis, section 163 may have been the sort of knee-jerk, penal legislation
that the Framers intended to prohibit.328 Politically and socially, penalizing
ACORN may not have been the right thing to do.329 However, as a matter
of law, Congress had an absolute right to prevent federal funds from
reaching ACORN.330
James O‘Keefe and Hannah Giles, in their politically motivated
endeavor, accomplished what they sought—the downfall of a public

326. See discussion supra part III.B.
327. E.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 326 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(observing that the Bill of Attainder Clause is ―only one of the safeguards of liberty in the
arsenal of the Constitution‖ and that ―other provisions . . . specific and comprehensive, [are]
effectively designed to assure the liberties of our citizens‖).
328. See STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (noting that during instances where the
legislature faces ―political excitements,‖ it is most likely to ―trample upon the rights and
liberties of others‖).
329. See John Atlas, ACORN Vindicated of Wrongdoing by the Congressional Watchdog
Office, HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2010, 2:41 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-atlas/acorn-vindicated-of-wrong_b_612265.html
(discussing the validity, or lack thereof, of accusations made regarding ACORN‘s
mismanagement of funds). See generally U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10648R, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON FUNDING, OVERSIGHT, AND INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS OF ACORN OR POTENTIALLY RELATED ORGANIZATIONS (2010) (finding no
major issues with ACORN‘s use of federal funding).
330. See discussion supra Part III.B.

interest group they perceived as their enemy. 331 But in what seems to be a
bittersweet coda for ACORN, the authenticity of the duo‘s work has been
heavily challenged.332 Still, the legacy of the scandal remains. Perhaps
ACORN suffered a ―social taint‖ of sorts, but it is not a stigma that the
Constitution, with its Bill of Attainder Clause, guards against.

331. See Larry Neumeister, ‘We’re On Life Support,’ Says ACORN Chief Outside Court,
As U.S. Fights Funding Ruling, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 20, 2010, 9:25 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/04/were_on_life_support_says_acor.html
(describing ACORN‘s precarious financial situation in the aftermath of the O‘Keefe
scandal).
332. See, e.g., CAL. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, supra note 145, at 8–9 (examining the controversy
surrounding the deceptive editing of the released ACORN videotapes).

